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Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

COALTER G. LATHROP

INTRODUCTION

Tripoint issues arise in maritime boundary delimitation where the maritime
areas of three coastal states converge and overlap. Where this trilateral
geographic relationship exists, so too does the potential for a tripoint at
which three bilateral maritime boundaries could intersect. The trilateral
geographic relationship, although it need not necessarily result in a tripoint,
creates a tripoint issue in the delimitation of each of the associated boundaries. Approximately one half of all maritime boundary delimitations
worldwide involve a tripoint issue,1 and of the boundaries addressed in this
series approximately two thirds involve at least one tripoint issue.2 For the
purpose of this chapter the treatment of tripoints is limited to those that
occur, or would occur, within 200 n.m. of the coasts of the three concerned
states.3 As more states extend jurisdiction beyond 200 n.m. with wide margin continental shelf claims, new tripoint relationships will arise.4
When a maritime boundary is delimited by negotiation or through judicial process, the primary concern of the negotiators, judges or arbitrators
is to locate the boundary between the two parties to the negotiation or proceeding. However, where the delimitation takes place within 200 n.m. of
third-state territory, a subsidiary question must also be answered: How
should the endpoint(s) of the bilateral boundary be defined in light of
possible third-state interests? The goal of this report is to provide the
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HANDBOOK ON THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES, UN Sales No. E.01.V.2 (2000) at 45.
Some of the boundaries addressed in these volumes, such as the boundary between France (Guadeloupe
and Martinique)-Venezuela, involve up to four tripoints in a single agreement. See Report
Number 2-11. However, the boundaries addressed in the following reports do not appear to contain any tripoint issues within 200 n.m.: 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-7, 3-8,
3-9, 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-13, 5-2, 5-7, 5-10, 5-18, 5-21, 5-26, 6-1, 6-21, 8-1, 8-3, 8-14, 9-2, 9-6,
9-24.
The Cape Verde-Senegal-The Gambia, and the Australia-Papua New Guinea-Solomon Islands tripoints may be exceptions to this rule. See Report Numbers 4-2, 4-8, 5-3, 5-4, 5-16.
For example, tripoint issues beyond 200 n.m. will likely arise in the Gulf of Mexico’s “Eastern
Gap” where the continental shelves of Cuba, Mexico and the United States converge. See Report
Numbers 1-4, 1-5, 2-8.

D.A. Colson and R.W. Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 3305-3375.
© 2005. The American Society of International Law. Printed in the Netherlands.
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boundary practitioner with some answers to that question based on the
maritime boundary delimitation practice of states, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) and maritime boundary tribunals.5
David Colson addressed tripoint issues briefly in his introductory chapter in Volume I.6 This report expands on Colson’s analysis by addressing
in greater detail the tripoint issues associated with maritime boundary
delimitation generally, and by focusing specifically on the tripoint issues
raised by the maritime boundary agreements reported in Volumes I-V.
Colson identified five techniques used by delimiting parties to deal with
tripoint issues.7 Four of those techniques are used in bilateral configurations and one is used in trilateral configurations. Colson’s four bilateral
techniques are: (1) creating an endpoint without explicit intent of future
extension,8 (2) creating an endpoint on a final line segment,9 (3) creating
an endpoint on an azimuth,10 and (4) creating an endpoint without prejudice to future extension.11 There is a fifth bilateral technique, creating an
endpoint that is explicitly identified as the tripoint. This fifth technique is
closely related to the first technique listed above, but it removes an element of uncertainty by specifying the exact nature of the endpoint, at least
in the minds of the two delimiting states. Colson also identified one technique used in trilateral configurations: creating a tripoint through a negotiated trilateral agreement.12 For the purpose of analysis in this report,
bilateral configurations and techniques are separated from trilateral configurations and techniques.
This report notes Colson’s delimitation techniques, refines them slightly,
adds a discussion about the evolving tripoint jurisprudence of international
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State practice with regard to delimiting maritime boundaries in the presence of third states is
quite robust. However, although the presence of a third state is often referred to in maritime
boundary treaties and the literature notes third-state interests as one of the factors to be considered in delimitation, surprisingly little has been written on this topic. But see Rodman R. Bundy,
State Practice in Maritime Delimitation, in 5 WORLD BOUNDARIES 18 (Gerald H. Blake ed., 1994)
(additional factor to be taken into account); HANDBOOK ON THE D ELIMITATION OF M ARITIME
BOUNDARIES, supra note 1, at 45 (“[S]pecial attention should be given to the presence of the
coasts of third States.”).
David Colson, The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements, in 1 I NTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES 41 (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993).
Id. at 61-63.
This is Colson’s second technique. Id. at 61-62.
This is Colson’s fifth technique. Id. at 63.
This is Colson’s first technique. Id. at 61.
This is Colson’s fourth technique. Id. at 62-63.
This is Colson’s third technique. Id. at 62.

ROBERT_f6-3305-3375 2/16/05 1:16 AM Page 3307

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

3307

courts and tribunals, takes a closer look at the trilateral aspects of tripoint
issues, and seeks to distinguish between the bilateral and trilateral perspectives.
The bilateral perspective is the perspective of the parties to a bilateral
boundary agreement delimited by and binding on only the two parties. This
is the perspective the parties to the bilateral agreement have on the tripoint
as they sight down their shared line toward the third state. The trilateral
perspective, on the other hand, is that of the three concerned states, nonparty states, judges, arbitrators, ocean users, academics, and others looking
down from above, as on a map, at the actual or, more interestingly, the
potential location and status of the tripoint. The two perspectives raise fundamentally different questions.
From the bilateral perspective the primary question is: How do the two
parties conclude their bilateral agreement in light of known or presumed
non-party, third-state interests? Specifically, how do they define the endpoint of their boundary in their bilateral boundary agreement? When the
bilateral agreement is the first of three agreements associated with a potential tripoint, the two parties have relatively little information regarding the
interests or boundary position of the third state. When the bilateral agreement is the second associated agreement, more information is available to
the parties. By the time the third of three associated boundaries is delimited, the parties to the third agreement will already have delimited their
boundaries with the third state. As a result of the previous two agreements,
the third-state interests should be well known.
The level of information available to the delimiting parties will affect
the way they define their endpoints. For example, the parties to the second
and third associated agreements will have a geographical reference formed
by the preceding agreement(s). They will know where the other boundary
(or boundaries) end and on what terms because one or both of the parties
will necessarily have been a party to an associated, preceding boundary
with the third state. With this knowledge the parties have several options.
They could avoid the tripoint by stopping short of the preceding boundary.13 They could create a complementary boundary, either by creating an
endpoint coincident with an endpoint in the preceding boundary,14 or by

13

14

For example, the Malaysia-Singapore boundary stops at point W25, well short of the endpoints
on the preceding Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-Singapore boundaries. See Report Numbers
5-20, 5-9, 5-11.
See Report Numbers 9-3(4) (France-United Kingdom), 9-16 (Belgium-France), 9-17 (BelgiumUnited Kingdom).
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specifying a direction for the last segment of their boundary that will intersect the preceding boundary at an unspecified, but identifiable point.15
Alternatively, parties to a second or third boundary could intentionally
overstep the preceding boundary.16 These overlapping boundary situations
are usually the result of a sovereignty dispute or disagreement as to delimitation method. Although there is great potential for more of them, these
overlaps are currently rare in practice.17
Two parties to a bilateral boundary agreement can not create a boundary endpoint binding on the third state regardless of their endpoint technique. This is so even if the third state is mentioned in the bilateral
agreement and the endpoint is referred to as the tripoint among the two
parties and that third state.18 A bilateral agreement drafted in this way does
not “trilateralize” the agreement and does not bind the third state. It may
however indicate a high degree of understanding among the three states as
to the location of the tripoint. This brings us to the second perspective –
the trilateral perspective.
From the trilateral perspective the primary questions are: (1) What is
the trilateral geographic relationship? (2) How are the endpoints in the
associated bilateral agreements defined? and (3) What does this information tell us about the status and likely location of the tripoint? In the event
that the tripoint has been agreed among the three concerned states in a tripoint treaty, it becomes an actual tripoint. Assuming that no “fourth” state
contests the tripoint agreement, the tripoint location and status are established and no further analysis is necessary. Although trilateral agreements
are becoming more common,19 the vast majority of tripoints lack a trilateral agreement. Without a trilateral agreement, tripoints are only potential
tripoints.

15
16
17

18
19

See Report Numbers 7-2 (Bahrain-Iran), 7-6 (Iran-Qatar), 7-13 (Bahrain-Qatar).
See Report Numbers 4-8 (Vol. IV) (Equatorial Guinea-Sao Tome and Principe), 4-11 (Gabon-Sao
Tome and Principe).
There appear to be only three tripoint situations in which the second boundary oversteps the first
boundary. They are the Colombia-Haiti-Jamaica, Dominican Republic-United States (Puerto
Rico)-Venezuela, and Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni)-Gabon-Sao Tome and Principe tripoints. The
quadrilateral relationship among Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela has also
produced two conflicting treaties and the potential tripoints associated with those treaties have
been identified as conflicting tripoints.
See Report Number 2-6 (Costa Rica-Panama).
At the time of this writing eight tripoint agreements have been concluded. See Report Numbers
6-7 (India-Indonesia-Thailand); 6-9 (India-Maldives-Sri Lanka); 6-11 (Add. 1) (India-Myanmar
(Burma)-Thailand); 6-12 (Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand); 10-12 (Poland-Sweden-Soviet Union);
10-17 (Estonia-Latvia-Sweden); 10-21 (Estonia-Finland-Sweden); and 11-4 (Azerbaijan-KazakhstanRussia).
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The status of potential tripoints falls along a spectrum of certainty. The
least certain of potential tripoints are those that exist solely by virtue of
the trilateral geographic relationship among three coastal states with overlapping maritime claims.20 These potential tripoints are not dealt with in
this report because they are not yet associated with any boundary agreement. The most certain potential tripoints are those whose three associated
bilateral agreements contain coincident endpoints.21 For these most certain
of potential tripoints a trilateral agreement would amount to little more
than a legalistic tidying up exercise. Nonetheless, without the trilateral
agreement even the most certain potential tripoint is in fact only three
coincident endpoints.
The bilateral and trilateral perspectives are closely related. The status
and location of the actual or potential tripoint is dependent on the behavior of the three concerned states in their bilateral relationships. Conversely,
the approach that parties to a bilateral agreement take to their endpoints is
affected by previous bilateral agreements and by the status and location of
the potential tripoint. Although the two perspectives are closely related,
this report seeks to separate them for analytical clarity. Section II of this
paper focuses on the bilateral perspective – that of parties, judges and arbitrators faced with a two-party delimitation in the presence of a non-party,
third state. Section III and the accompanying table focus on the trilateral
perspective – a look from above at the current status and likely location of
tripoints in light of the coastal geography and existing bilateral agreements
and judicial decisions.

I THE BILATERAL PERSPECTIVE

With regard to tripoint issues, the first step for parties to a bilateral maritime boundary delimitation is to determine whether any third-state interests exist. As noted above, approximately one-third of the boundary agreements
reported in these volumes do not involve any third-state interests. The lack
of third-state interests simplifies matters immensely. For the other two-

20

21

Examples of potential tripoints that exist only by virtue of trilateral geographic relationships are:
Bangladesh-Burma-India; Djibouti-Somalia-Yemen; Algeria-Morocco-Spain; Bahamas-HaitiUnited Kingdom (Turks and Caicos); and Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines.
See, e.g., Report Numbers 5-1 (Australia-France (New Caledonia)), 5-4 (Australia-Solomon
Islands), 5-17 (France (New Caledonia)-Solomon Islands).
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thirds, the presence of a third state is a complicating factor that must be
addressed.
Identifying the existence of tripoint issues, if any, is discussed in
Section A. Once third-state interests have been identified, the parties must
decide how to address those interests in the definition of their boundary.
The five techniques used by delimiting states to deal with third-state interests are discussed in Section B. Finally, international courts and tribunals
tasked with delimitation between two parties often find themselves faced
with non-party, third-state interests. How courts and tribunals have dealt
with tripoint issues in the seven cases in which they have arisen is discussed in Section C.

A Identifying Tripoint Issues
The parties to a bilateral delimitation must first determine whether a tripoint issue exists, with which third state, and what the nature of the issue
is. Where one or both parties have delimited their boundary with the third
state, the third-state interests may already be clear. This gives the parties
to the present delimitation something to meet up with, to avoid, or if there
are overlapping claims, to purposely overstep. In the absence of any preexisting delimitations, the parties should rely in the first instance on the
coastal geography to determine whether and with whom they have a trilateral geographic relationship.
Where two adjacent coastal states face toward areas of open ocean,
unimpeded by third-state territory or maritime claims, tripoint relationships
do not arise.22 However, in areas with constricted coastal relationships,
such as semi-enclosed seas, or concave coastlines, the maritime areas of
most coastal states overlap the claims of at least two other coastal states
and tripoint relationships abound.23 In an equidistant world devoid of sovereignty disputes, it would be clear which states have tripoint relationships
with each other and where those tripoints would be located. The reality is
that unresolved territorial disputes and claims to maritime area beyond equidistant lines create significant uncertainty, not only with regard to the loca-

22
23

The South American region, for example, has only one tripoint. See generally Region III boundary reports, documents and regional analyses in this series.
The Middle America and Caribbean region has 32 tripoints. See generally Region II boundary
reports, documents and regional analyses in this series.
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tion of a potential tripoint, but more fundamentally, with regard to the very
existence of a tripoint relationship in the first place.
1 Coastal Relationships
The first step in determining whether a trilateral geographic relationship
exists is to measure distances from coasts. Wide margin continental shelf
claims aside, State A will not have a maritime boundary relationship with
State B unless their coasts are within 400 n.m. of each other. If State B is
within 400 n.m. of State A, the second step is to determine whether a third
state, State C, is within 400 n.m. of both State A and State B. If so, States
A, B, and C have a trilateral geographic relationship that creates a potential tripoint. Although it is sound policy for a state to begin its analysis this
way, this approach assumes that all three states view their boundary relationships in terms of equidistance. Until the boundary positions of all three
states are ascertained and agreed, some uncertainty will still exist.
A classic illustration of this uncertainty is the changing relationship
among the North Sea states of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands
from the 1960s to the early 1970s.24 In 1966 Denmark and the Netherlands
delimited an equidistant boundary taking into account the existence of the
two neighboring states – the United Kingdom to the west and Germany to
the east.25 At the western end of their boundary the parties created an endpoint that coincided with the northern endpoint of the Netherlands-United
Kingdom boundary and the southern endpoint of the Denmark-United Kingdom
boundary.26 At the eastern end of their boundary Denmark and the Netherlands created an endpoint that was equidistant from the coasts of Denmark,
Germany and the Netherlands.27 On the basis of equidistance applied to the
coastal configuration of the North Sea, the Netherlands and Denmark
assumed a Denmark-Germany-Netherlands tripoint relationship and a
Denmark-Netherlands-United Kingdom tripoint relationship. With hindsight
we see that neither relationship endured. Germany’s successful equity
claim before the ICJ overcame its neighbors’ equidistance presumptions
and obtained for Germany a much larger piece of the North Sea than it

24

25
26
27

Colson mentions this same example in his Vol. I chapter as an illustration of “the danger in
assuming the views of a third state.” Colson, supra note 6, at 63. The danger is that tripoint relationships assumed to exist in fact do not.
Report Number 9-18.
Report Numbers 9-10, 9-13, 9-18.
Report Number 9-18 at 2499.
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would otherwise have received. As a result of subsequent Denmark-Germany
and Germany-Netherlands boundary agreements, concluded in the early 1970s,
the two tripoint relationships created by the Denmark-Netherlands boundary were extinguished and two new tripoint relationships, not previously
contemplated, were created: Denmark-Germany-United Kingdom and
Germany-Netherlands-United Kingdom.28
The geographic relationship among the coasts of the concerned states is
still the appropriate starting point for identifying tripoint issues. The above
illustration is merely a cautionary tale for those who assume too much
about their neighbors.
2 Sovereignty Disputes
The uncertainty exemplified in the relationship among Denmark, Germany,
and the Netherlands, where there was no disputed coastal territory, is exacerbated by sovereignty disputes over coastal territory, including islands.
Often sovereignty disputes create uncertainty as to the location of a tripoint, but do not alter which states are involved in the tripoint relationship.
This is so among Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.
The long-standing sovereignty dispute over several small islands in Corisco
Bay has delayed delimitation of the Equatorial Guinea-Gabon boundary
and thus the tripoint among the three states. The outcome of this sovereignty dispute could impact the location of the tripoint, but the trilateral
relationship will still be among those three states. A similar situation exists
among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and the sovereignty dispute over
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh.29 As a result of that dispute, the location
and number of the tripoints is uncertain.30 That the tripoint(s) will be
among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is not.
This is not always so. There are situations in which the outcome of a
sovereignty dispute will alter both the location of the tripoint and which

28
29

30

Report Numbers 9-8 and 9-11.
See ICJ Press Release 2003/22 (July 24, 2003); Joint Notification to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice of the Dispute between Malaysia and Singapore Concerning Sovereignty
over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (July 24, 2003), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/ecjwww/idocket/imasi/imasiorder/imasi_iapplication_20030724.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2004).
If Singapore is sovereign over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, there could be three IndonesiaMalaysia-Singapore tripoints in the eastern Singapore Strait. If Malaysia is sovereign, there would
be only one. Regardless of the outcome in this territorial sovereignty case, there will also be an
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore tripoint in the west near the confluence of the Singapore, Malacca
and Johor Straits.
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states are involved in the tripoint relationship. For example, the outcome
in the dispute between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima/Dokto
could affect the location of the tripoint, but it could also determine whether
Japan and South Korea have a tripoint relationship with North Korea or
with Russia. Similarly, the outcome of the sovereignty dispute between Guyana
and Venezuela over the Essequibo region could determine whether Guyana
has tripoint relationships with Trinidad and Tobago or Barbados, or no tripoint relationships at all.

B Drafting Options
Colson identified four techniques that states use to address tripoint issues
that arise during bilateral delimitations. This report adds a fifth technique
and provides a stylized, but descriptive, symbol to represent each technique.31 In Sections 1 through 5 below these bilateral techniques are
described in more detail, and examples from actual treaty texts are provided. The techniques are listed in decreasing order of certainty with
regard to the location of their associated potential tripoint. The first and
second techniques create well-defined endpoints that may or may not
become actual tripoints through further agreement. The third and fourth
techniques create undefined, floating endpoints that are often described in
reference to a third state and which will only become well-defined points
as a result of agreement with that state. The fifth technique creates a welldefined, but probably temporary endpoint, beyond which the parties intend
to extend their boundary in the future.
1 Tripoint Identified
Using this technique the two delimiting states take it upon themselves to
define their tripoint even in the absence of the third state. Often the
parties will refer to the third state by name. However, merely calling an
endpoint of a bilateral boundary a tripoint does not “trilateralize” the
agreement, even if the third state is named explicitly. Nevertheless, this
drafting technique does clarify the intentions of the two parties with regard

31

These symbols are used in the accompanying table as a shorthand for designating the endpoint
technique in each agreement.
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to the third state and may indicate some degree of trilateral understanding.
Below are three examples.
The 2003 Cape Verde-Mauritania boundary agreement uses this technique. Article 6 describes the southern endpoint of this boundary as follows: “[P]oint H . . . constitutes a tripartite frontier point for the Republic
of Cape Verde, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Republic of
Senegal.”32 This point is nearly coincident with point H of the 1993 boundary between Cape Verde and Senegal.33 However, there is no associated trilateral agreement, and no boundary between Mauritania and Senegal has
yet been agreed.
The 2002 Kazakhstan-Russia boundary treaty also uses this technique.
Article 1 describes the endpoint in the Caspian Sea in the following manner: “The endpoint of the modified median line is the point with coordinates 42° 33.6' N and 49° 53.3' E. . . . The above point may be taken as
the junction point of the lines of demarcation of the Caspian seabed . . .
among the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijani
Republic, which will be recorded in a trilateral agreement among them.”34
The agreement between Kazakhstan and Russia was the first agreement
associated with the Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Russia tripoint. That this language was included in the first of three bilateral agreements could indicate
previous diplomatic correspondence on the tripoint issue among the three
states.
The 1971 Denmark-United Kingdom boundary treaty also uses this
technique. After providing the coordinates of the endpoints in Article 2, Article
3 provides that “[i]n the north the termination point of the dividing line is
the point of intersection of the dividing lines between the Continental
Shelves of the Kingdom of Denmark, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of Norway.”35 This endpoint is
coincident with endpoints in the 1965 Denmark-Norway agreement and the
1965 Norway-United Kingdom agreement, although no tripoint agreement
has been concluded. This linguistic formula is repeated in many of the
other North Sea boundary treaties.

32
33
34
35

Report
Report
Report
Report

Number
Number
Number
Number

4-12 in this volume.
4-8 (Vol. III).
11-2 in this volume.
9-10 at 1833-34.
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2 Endpoint without Explicit Intent of Future Extension
This technique allows the two delimiting states to define their endpoint
without calling it a tripoint or referring to third states. Although the endpoint is clearly defined, a question remains as to its status in the minds of
the delimiting states. Because they express no intent to extend their boundary beyond the endpoint, the endpoint could represent their version of a
tripoint. However, mere silence does not preclude future extension, and the
tripoint ultimately could be located beyond the delimiting parties’ endpoint.36 This technique usually takes the form of a list of coordinates to be
connected by straight lines without reference to any extension beyond the
first or last points in the list. Below are two examples.
The 1977 Cuba-United States boundary agreement uses this technique.
Article 1 begins: “The maritime boundary between the United States of
America and the Republic of Cuba shall be determined by the geodetic
lines connecting the following coordinates.”37 The treaty then supplies a
list of coordinates for 27 turning points without mention of a third state or
the possibility of future extension beyond points 1 or 27. Of course, there
is a third state present in the vicinity of point 1 – the Bahamas – but neither party had concluded a boundary agreement with the Bahamas at the
time of their agreement. Point 1 of the United States-Cuba boundary is

36

37

States need not reserve the right to extend their boundary in order to extend it in the future.
However, for the purposes of this analysis and for the sake of consistency in categorization of
these agreements, this study assumes no intent to extend unless that intent is explicit in the text
of the agreement. This purely textual approach can produce results inconsistent with reality. For
example, although Japan and South Korea do not refer in their boundary treaty to the future
extension of their boundary beyond the northernmost point, point 35, one can assume that the
parties intend to extend their boundary after resolution of their sovereignty dispute over
Dokto/Takeshima. See Report Number 5-12.
The territorial sea boundary agreement between France and Italy provides another example of
a treaty in which the endpoints clearly do not coincide with the parties’ notion of final endpoints.
Although the agreement clearly is limited to the territorial sea and ends at the outer limits of that
zone, because it does not indicate an explicit intent to extend beyond those endpoints it is
assigned the technique of endpoint without explicit intent of future extension. See Report Number
8-2.
Some treaties indicate that they are limited to a specific geographic area. The implication
is that there is still more boundary to be delimited outside that geographic area. This is so in
the boundary agreement between China and Vietnam, which creates a boundary “between the
two countries in the Tonkin Gulf (emphasis added).” Report Number 5-25 in this volume. Nonetheless,
because there is no explicit intent to extend the boundary beyond the Tonkin Gulf, the agreement
is assigned the endpoint without explicit intent of future extension technique.
Report Number 1-4 at 423.
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equidistant from the parties and the Bahamas.38 Although this may signal
the parties’ intent to delimit an equidistant tripoint with the Bahamas, the
final location of the Bahamas-Cuba-United States tripoint is still open to
negotiation.
The 1990 France (New Caledonia)-Solomon Islands boundary agreement also uses this technique. Article 1 provides that “[t]he line of delimitation of maritime areas between the Solomon Islands and the French
Republic is the line which lies along the loxodromes connecting the point
[sic] defined by their coordinates as follows.”39 A list of four sets of coordinates for points 23 through 26a follows. Although the third state – here
Australia – is not mentioned, nor is there any reference to a tripoint, in fact
point 23 coincides with the endpoints of the two preceding, associated
treaties – Australia-France (New Caledonia), and Australia-Solomon Islands.40
Here, France and the Solomon Islands clearly intended to create a boundary in harmony with the two foregoing agreed boundaries.
3 Endpoint on Final Line Segment
This technique creates a floating, undefined endpoint located somewhere along
a defined final line segment. Using this technique, the delimiting parties
define a penultimate turning point and a range point as the starting and
ending points of the final line segment. The parties also usually define the
nature of the line segment itself. For example, the line segment may be
defined as a geodetic line, an arc of maximum circumference, or a loxodrome often with a specified azimuth or direction. If the parties use an
azimuth to define the nature of the final line segment, it does not matter
whether the azimuth is defined from the penultimate turning point toward
the range point41 or from the range point back to the penultimate turning
point.42 The result is still a line segment between the penultimate turning
point and the range point along which the endpoint of the bilateral agreement will be located. In most instances, this technique is used purposefully
by parties to a boundary negotiation as a way to define a range of possible tripoint locations. However, the balkanization of Yugoslavia and the

38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 420; Limits in the Sea No. 110, Maritime Boundary: Cuba-United States, US DOS, Bureau
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, February 21, 1990, at 3.
Report Number 5-17 at 1172.
Report Numbers 5-1, 5-4.
Report Number 2-14.
Report Number 7-2.
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Soviet Union unintentionally has created similar boundary configurations in
the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas.43 Below are three examples.
This is a popular drafting technique in the Caribbean and is used
repeatedly by both Colombia and Venezuela. The 1978 United States
(Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands)-Venezuela boundary treaty uses this
technique. Article 2 states that the western end of that boundary is formed
by a line on “an azimuth of 274.23 degrees true from point 22 [penultimate turning point], in the event the maritime boundary of the United
States of America extends westward, until the tri-junction with a third State
is reached. In no case shall this tri-junction point be further westward than
[15° 14' 28" N, 68° 51' 44" W] [range point].”44 This description appears
to conflict with the endpoint described in the associated bilateral agreement
between the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.45

43

44
45

For example, the Soviet Union and Turkey concluded a series of boundary agreements in the
Black Sea from their land boundary terminus in the east to a potential tripoint in the west. As is
normally the case, the resulting boundary line consisted of a series of line segments defined by
turning points. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one coastal state became three –
Georgia, Russia and Ukraine. As successors to the Soviet Union, all three have committed to
respecting the boundary agreements of the Soviet Union, including those with Turkey in the
Black Sea. Report Numbers 8-10(4) and (5). Although the boundary between Turkey and its three
northern neighbors is complete, because there are not yet any adjacent boundaries between
Georgia and Russia and between Russia and Ukraine, it is not clear where the tripoints will be
located. It is clear, however, that the tripoints will be located on line segments defined in the
original agreements between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Therefore, the unintentional creation
of final line segments is similar to the purposeful use of this technique.
Essentially the same series of events has occurred in the Adriatic Sea originally between Italy
and Yugoslavia and subsequently between Italy on the one hand and Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia
and Montenegro on the other. See Report Number 8-7(3). Bosnia-Herzegovina is zone-locked by
Croatia. Report Number 8-14.
As a successor to the Soviet Union, Russia’s situation in the Baltic Sea, with respect to Finland
and Sweden, is similar to its situation with Turkey in the Black Sea. See Report Numbers 104(1), (2), (3), (4) and 10-9.
Report Number 2-14 at 702. Note the conditional clause in this provision which indicates that
point 22 could be the endpoint without further extension.
In the corresponding Dominican Republic-Venezuela boundary treaty concluded the following
year the parties describe the eastern sector of their boundary (Sector B) using the same points
(United States-Venezuela point 22 and the United States-Venezuela range point). The description
of Sector B is: “Starting from point 7, [15° 14' 28" N, 68° 51' 44" W], a geodesic line whose
azimuth is 94°, 13, . . . to a point at [15° 12' 51" N, 68° 28' 56" W].” Report Number 2-9 at 589.
This description raises three problems. First, a geodetic line, with rare exceptions, has a constantly changing direction and so cannot accurately be described by a single azimuth. Second, if
this final segment is a geodesic line connecting the two points, it will not coincide throughout
its length with the loxodrome described in the United States-Venezuela treaty. Third, and most
importantly, is the use of the word “to” in the United States-Venezuela treaty. If “to” means
“toward,” the Dominican Republic-Venezuela boundary could be seen as consistent with the corresponding United States-Venezuela boundary. However, if “to” means that the boundary reaches
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The 1978 Netherlands (Saba and Saint Eustatius)-Venezuela (Aves) boundary agreement uses this technique to describe the endpoints of Sector D.
Article 2 describes the eastern endpoint of Sector D in this way: “From
point No. 15, an arc of maximum circumference to point No. 16 [16° 40'
01" N, 63° 35' 20" W], or that point on said maximum circumference that
represents the boundary with third nations.”46
The 1971 Bahrain-Iran boundary treaty uses this technique. In relevant
part, Article 1 states: “Point (1) [floating endpoint] is the Eastern-most
point on the Eastern-most part of the Northern boundary line of the continental shelf appertaining to Bahrain as formed by the intersection of a line
starting from [27° 00' 35" N, 51° 23' 00" E] [range point], and having a
geodetic azimuth of 278 degrees, 14 minutes, 27 seconds, with a boundary line dividing the continental shelf appertaining to Bahrain and Qatar,
thence” point 2 [penultimate turning point].47 The range point and azimuth
are identical to the penultimate turning point and azimuth in the neighboring Iran-Qatar boundary agreement concluded two years earlier in 1969.
The use of this technique by Bahrain and Iran in conjunction with the previous Iran-Qatar agreement created an agreed line segment between the
range point and penultimate turning point along which the Bahrain-IranQatar tripoint is theoretically located. The recent ICJ decision in the case
between Bahrain and Qatar creates an azimuth that points toward the
agreed line segment and the potential Bahrain-Iran-Qatar tripoint.
4 Endpoint on Azimuth
This technique creates a floating, undefined endpoint located somewhere along
a defined azimuth. Parties using this technique define a penultimate turning point and an azimuth, but do not define a range point and therefore do
not limit the distance along the azimuth at which the endpoint could be
located. This technique provides a compromise between, on the one hand,
leaving the final segment of a boundary entirely undefined for lack of
third-state participation and, on the other hand, creating a defined final
endpoint that may be challenged by the third state. For this reason, this

46
47

the second point, a point identical to point 22 of the United States-Venezuela boundary, then this
treaty indicates an intent to create a fixed endpoint located at the second point (United StatesVenezuela point 22), rather than a floating endpoint located short of point 22.
Report Number 2-12 at 633.
Report Number 7-2 at 1487.
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technique is often used in the third-party settlement of maritime boundary
disputes. Below are two examples.
The 1999 Latvia-Lithuania maritime boundary treaty uses this technique
to describe the last segment of the boundary. Article 2 defines the final
segment of the Latvia-Lithuania boundary: “The boundary . . . shall be a
straight line (loxodrome) in the azimuth of 270 (two hundred seventy
degrees) running from the point II [penultimate turning point] defined in
the Article 1 towards the boundary of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the third State.”48
The 2000 Saudi Arabia-Yemen maritime boundary treaty also uses this
technique. In Annex 3 the final segment of the boundary as it approaches
a potential tripoint with Eritrea is described in the following manner:
“From there [16° 17' 24" N, 41° 47' 00" E, it proceeds] in a straight line
parallel to the latitudes in the direction of west until the terminus of the
maritime boundaries between the two countries.” 49 This language provides
information about the latitude of the endpoint (16° 17' 24" N) but does not
provide information about the location of the tripoint along that parallel
other than that it is west of 41° 47' 00" E. How far west will be determined by the location of the as yet undelimited Eritrea-Saudi Arabia
boundary to the north and the partially delimited Eritrea-Yemen boundary
to the south.50
5 Endpoint without Prejudice to Future Extension
This final technique can be divided into two sub-techniques, both of which
create ambiguity around the endpoint of a boundary line. The first subtechnique – the fuzzy azimuth – resembles the defined azimuth technique
just described. However, instead of providing an azimuth in terms of
degrees or by combining a general direction with other specific information,51 this sub-technique provides only a general direction for the possible
future extension of the boundary. The second sub-technique – the ambivalent endpoint – resembles the endpoint without explicit intent of future
extension technique described above except that here the parties explicitly

48
49
50
51

Report Number 10-20 at 3126.
Report Number 6-16 at 2807.
See Report Number 6-14.
See Report Number 6-16 (Saudi Arabia-Yemen) (“a straight line parallel to the latitudes in the
direction of west”).
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reserve the right to extend the boundary or to revise the endpoint.52 These
two sub-techniques often are used together. Because this fifth technique
contemplates an extension, or at least a revision, of the boundary, but does
not provide the specific direction nor the maximum distance of the extension, this technique results in more ambiguity as to the likely location of
the tripoint than any of the techniques above. It also reserves the most
flexibility for the delimiting states and as a result is a popular technique.
Below are five examples.
Article 2 of the 2001 Honduras-United Kingdom (Cayman Islands)
boundary treaty uses a combination of the fuzzy azimuth and ambivalent
endpoint sub-techniques. After describing three turning points A, B, and C
in Article 1, Article 2 describes the line beyond point C in the following
manner: “It has not been possible, for the time being, to complete the maritime delimitation beyond point C. It is, however, agreed between the
Parties that the delimitation from point C shall, at the appropriate time, be
continued in an easterly direction until it meets the tripoint between the
limits of the maritime areas under the respective jurisdictions of the Parties
and another State’s jurisdiction.”53
The 1977 Greece-Italy boundary treaty also contains elements of both
sub-techniques. Article 1, paragraph 3 states: “The Contracting Parties have
agreed that for the moment such delimitation shall not extend northward
beyond point 1 or southward beyond point 16. This delimitation shall subsequently extend in both directions to the points of intersection with the
zones of the continental shelf belonging to the respective neighboring
countries.”54
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the 1974 Italy-Spain boundary treaty contains
similar language: “The Contracting Parties agree that, for the moment, the
delimitation will not extend north further than point A, and south further
than point L.”55

52

53

54
55

Some texts are more explicit than others in indicating their intent to extend beyond their final
endpoint. This study has made the greatest effort to be consistent in the categorization of those
agreements that use the second technique – no explicit intent to extend – and those that use this
sub-technique – ambivalent endpoint.
Report Number 2-23 in this volume. It appears that the third state could be either Colombia,
Jamaica or Nicaragua, depending upon the outcome of two cases currently before the ICJ
(Nicaragua v. Honduras and Nicaragua v. Colombia) and also upon Jamaica’s boundary position
with regard to its nearest neighbor to the south, which ever state that turns out to be.
Report Number 8-4 at 1599.
Report Number 8-5 at 1607.
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The 2000 Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria boundary treaty uses the ambiguity created by this technique to protect the parties’ interests while avoiding
a contemporaneous ICJ boundary case. Article 3 reads: “Northwards and
eastwards from Point (i) identified in Article 2 the maritime boundary shall
be established by the Contracting Parties . . . following completion of the
maritime aspects of the case before the International Court of Justice between the Federal Republic of Nigera and the Republic of Cameroon. . . .”56
As with the Italian examples, the parties contemplate a future extension of
the boundary beyond a defined endpoint.
Article 1 of the 2003 Cyprus-Egypt boundary treaty uses the ambivalent endpoint sub-technique. Regarding the future disposition of their endpoints, the parties agreed that “the geographical coordinates of points 1 and
8 could be reviewed and/or extended as necessary in light of future delimitation of the EEZ with other concerned neighboring states and in accordance with an agreement to be reached in this matter by neighboring states
concerned.”57 Unlike the above examples of this technique, the use of the
word “review” seems to leave open the possibility of shortening, rather
than extending, the final segments of this boundary.

C Practice of the Court and Tribunals
The ICJ and boundary tribunals have been cautious about prejudicing the
interests of non-party third states by overstepping the claims of those states
in their boundary decisions. While the ICJ and tribunals are careful to protect non-party interests, they are also committed to fully discharging their
duties vis-à-vis the parties before them by delimiting their entire maritime
boundary or as much of the maritime boundary as has been requested.
These two considerations create an obvious tension for the dispute settlement body, which must carefully balance the interests of the parties with
the interests of non-party third states.
The following three subsections divide the “third-state” cases into three
categories:58 (1) those in which the geographic limits of the delimitation
were defined by the parties; (2) those in which the geographic limits of the

56
57
58

Report Number 4-9 at 2667.
Report Number 8-16 in this volume.
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases are not included because the Court was not asked to
delimit specific boundaries, but only to provide the principles that should be used by the parties
in their subsequent negotiations. It should be noted that in the North Sea cases the Court, in

ROBERT_f6-3305-3375 2/16/05 1:16 AM Page 3322

3322

Coalter G. Lathrop

delimitation were not defined by the parties, but in which the third-state
interests were known to the dispute settlement body; and (3) those in
which the geographic limits were not defined, nor were third-state interests
known.59 Where the parties have defined the outer geographic limits of
the delimitation, the tripoint issues are much simplified. However, partydefined limits have not prevented dispute settlement bodies from questioning the appropriateness of those limits. Where third-state interests were
known to the dispute settlement body, those interests generally have been
respected.60 Where third-state interests were not known, courts and tribunals appear to have limited the geographic scope of their decisions to
within the equidistant line between the parties and the third state. In most
cases, the dispute settlement body has been careful to point out that, in any
event, the effect of its decision is only binding on the parties.
Each case synopsis below contains a brief description of the geographic
context of the case, the third-state interests to the extent they were known,
and the drafting technique used by the dispute settlement body to avoid
prejudicing that third-state interest. In the two cases with clear, partydefined limits, the dispute settlement bodies created endpoints without
explicit intent of future extension.61 However, in the cases in which the
parties did not define the geographic scope of their requested delimitation,
dispute settlement bodies have limited themselves to the two most ambiguous drafting techniques described in the previous section: (1) creating an
endpoint on an azimuth,62 and (2) creating an endpoint without prejudice
to future extension.63
1 Party-Defined Limits
France/United Kingdom (Ireland)64
In this arbitration the ad hoc Court of Arbitration was requested to delimit
the continental shelf boundary “westward of 30 minutes west of the Greenwich

59
60
61
62
63
64

enumerating the relevant principles, referred to continental shelf delimitations, actual or prospective, with third states in the region. 1969 I.C.J. 31 (Feb. 20).
In two of the cases with two endpoints, Eritrea/Yemen and Qatar v. Bahrain, the endpoints are
in different categories.
For an exception, see the tribunal’s treatment of known Saudi Arabian interests in Eritrea/Yemen.
These cases include: France/United Kingdom; and Denmark v. Norway.
These cases include: Tunisia v. Libya; Qatar v. Bahrain; and Cameroon v. Nigeria.
These cases include: Libya v. Malta; and Eritrea/Yemen.
Report Number 9-3.
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Meridian as far as the 1,000 metre isobath.”65 With this description the parties created clear geographic limits for the court. This description put any
Belgian interest in the northeast well outside the scope of the court’s consideration. However, Irish interests at the southwestern end of this boundary were potentially within the scope of the Court of Arbitration’s mandate.
No other delimitations existed in the vicinity of the southwestern limit at
the time.
Although it does not appear from the record that Ireland submitted any
information directly to the Court of Arbitration, Ireland’s interests were
generally known through the submission, by the parties, of diplomatic correspondence and other documents.66 What the Court of Arbitration knew of
Ireland’s interests concerned it enough to ask the parties about “the possibility of the continental shelf boundary between France and the United
Kingdom meeting the boundary between the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland at a tripoint to the east of the 1,000-metre isobath,” that is,
within the geographic limit defined by the parties.67 The parties’ replies
apparently did not “negative altogether the possibility” of a France-IrelandUnited Kingdom tripoint within the area to be delimited.68 In an attempt to
balance the competing interests of fully discharging its delimitation duties
to the parties on the one hand, and protecting the interests of Ireland on
the other, the Court of Arbitration made two relevant statements. First, that
it was not “open to the Court . . . to pronounce in these proceedings on the
position of the tripoint.”69 Second, that “[t]he Court’s Decision . . . will neither be binding upon nor create any rights or obligations for any third
State, and in particular for the Republic of Ireland, for which this Decision
will be res inter alios acta.”70
With these assurances the Court of Arbitration then proceeded to
delimit the boundary as far as the 1,000 meter isobath. Point N of the decision, the final southwestern point, represents the intersection between the
France-United Kingdom continental shelf boundary and the 1,000 meter

65
66

67
68
69
70

Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Fr./U.K.) 18 I.L.M. 397, 400 (1979)
(June 30, 1977).
Id. at 411. The pleadings in this arbitration are not public, so information about the positions of
the parties and information before the Court of Arbitration must be gleaned from the judgments
and from reviews of the decision written by scholars with inside information.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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isobath.71 A decade after the decision in this case, Ireland and the United
Kingdom concluded their continental shelf treaty in the Celtic Sea and into
the Atlantic Ocean.72 That boundary passed to the west of point N leaving
for future negotiations a potential France-Ireland-United Kingdom tripoint
beyond the end of the line established by the Court of Arbitration.
Denmark v. Norway (Iceland)73
In this case the ICJ was asked to delimit the maritime boundary between
Denmark’s territory of Greenland and Norway’s island of Jan Mayen.
Iceland is located to the south within 400 n.m. of both parties and had
already delimited most of its boundary with Norway (Jan Mayen) at the
time of this case. Denmark, in its Memorial, defined the southern limit of
the area to be delimited as the 200 n.m. limit from the nearest Icelandic
territory.74 This represented Iceland’s maximum claim and was designed to
avoid prejudicing any Icelandic interests. The Court, in its judgment,
adopted the Danish definition of the area to be delimited, writing “to the
south it is limited by a line BCD on sketch-map No. 1 representing the
limit of the 200-mile economic zone claimed by Iceland. Denmark requests
the Court to limit its decision to the areas north of that line, a position
which is accepted by Norway.”75
This case presented a unique situation in which the maximum claim of
the third state was known to the parties and the Court, and that claim was
used by the parties to define the outer limit of the Court’s delimitation
exercise.
Not surprisingly the Court defined the southern endpoint of its line,
point M, as “on the 200-mile line claimed by Iceland.”76 In a subsequent
1995 agreement between the parties, which “recorded the consent of the
two governments to draw the boundary . . . in accordance with the Court’s
judgment,” point M was shifted very slightly and renamed point 4.77 The
preamble to the 1995 agreement refers to the delimitation of the boundary

71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Report Number 9-3, at 1743.
Report Number 9-5.
Report Number 9-19.
Report Number 9-19 at 2514.
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J.
38, 47 (June 14). (footnote omitted).
Id. at 79.
Report Number 9-19 at 2509.
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south of point 4 which “must be effected in consultation with Iceland.”78
In fact, two years later Denmark and Norway, having consulted Iceland,
signed a protocol to their 1995 agreement, which defined point 5 – the purported Denmark-Iceland-Norway tripoint.79
2 No Party-Defined Limits, Third-State Interests Known
Tunisia v. Libya (Malta)80
In their Special Agreement the parties asked the ICJ what were “the principles and rules of international law which may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to [Tunisia] and the
area of the continental shelf appertaining to [Libya].”81 The parties left it
to the Court to determine the geographic limits of those areas vis-à-vis
third states.82 Two third states were present in the vicinity of this delimitation – Italy and Malta. Italy had already defined its interests as against
Tunisia in a maritime boundary agreement concluded several years earlier.83 That agreement ended at a point approximately equidistant from
Malta and the mid-sea Italian islands of Linosa and Lampedusa.84 At the
time of this case Italy had expressed no boundary interest as against Libya
in this area.85 Apparently satisfied that its interests would not be endangered by the Court’s delimitation, Italy did not attempt to express those

78
79
80
81

82

83
84
85

Report Number 9-19 at 2524.
Report Number 9-19(2) at 2919.
Report Number 8-9.
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 18, 21 (Feb. 24). Unlike the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases in which the parties requested only the principles, the parties to this case went on to
request the Court “to specify precisely the practical way in which the aforesaid principles and
rules apply in this particular situation so as to enable the experts of the two countries to delimit
those areas without any difficulty.” Id.
In oral argument on Malta’s application to intervene in Tunisia v. Libya, Malta’s agent highlighted
the problem the Court would face in defining the outer geographic limit of its jurisdiction solely
on the basis of the language of the Special Agreement. The parties’ argument “is to the effect
that Malta’s situation cannot be affected because the Libya/Tunisia proceedings are so conceived
that any delimitation of the continental shelf boundary lines of those two States will be suspended at the point where it might impinge on those of other States in the region. Here I might
ask . . . how will it be known when that point is reached without entering upon the question of
Malta’s continental shelf entitlement?” Oral Arguments on the Application by Malta for
Permission to Intervene (Tunis./Libya), I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Continental Shelf) at 285 (Mar. 19,
1981).
Report Number 8-6.
Report Number 8-6 at 1612.
See Written Observations of Libya on Application by Italy for Permission to Intervene
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interests to the Court and, in fact, did not even request the pleadings in
this case.86
Malta took a more proactive approach to protecting its interests by
applying to intervene in the proceedings. Although Malta’s attempt to intervene was ultimately unsuccessful, it did afford Malta the opportunity,
through written and oral pleadings, to make the Court aware of the geographic extent of its interests. Malta defined its interests with an equidistant line between Malta and the three neighboring states: Tunisia, Libya
and Italy (with the exception of Italy’s mid-sea islands of Linosa and
Lampedusa to which Malta gave only 12 n.m. belts).87 Upon denying
Malta’s application to intervene, the Court assured Malta that it understood
Malta’s “preoccupations . . . regarding possible implications for its own
interests of the Court’s findings.”88 Judge Oda went farther in his separate
opinion, writing that “the legal interests of Malta . . . will be sufficiently
safeguarded by this Court, the more so because Malta has by its argument
brought its understandable preoccupations to the Court’s attention.”89
With Malta’s interests in mind the Court turned to the tasks of identifying the principles and rules of delimitation to be used between the parties and specifying the way in which those principles and rules should be
used to delimit a boundary. In the judgment the Court referred to “the
rights of other States” in the area,90 and acknowledged that “the terminal
point to seaward of the delimitation line . . . cannot be determined with any
precision by the Court” because of the presence of third states.91 In order
to deal with this limitation, the Court defined the penultimate turning point,
which was located well outside Malta’s area of interest, and then provided
an azimuth of 52° from that point, specifying that “the extension of this
line northeastwards is a matter falling outside the jurisdiction of the Court
in the present case, as it will depend on the delimitation to be agreed with

86
87
88
89
90
91

(Libya/Malta), I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Continental Shelf) at 429 (“[T]he Application now made by
Italy is the first occasion on which Italy has sought vis-à-vis Libya the establishment of claims
to areas of continental shelf involving delimitation between their respective areas of continental
shelf.”).
See Oral Arguments on the Application by Malta for Permission to Intervene (Tunis./Libya),
I.C.J. Pleadings (3 Continental Shelf) at 446 (Mar. 23, 1981).
See id. at 300 (Mar. 19, 1981). See also Oral Arguments on the Application by Malta for
Permission to Intervene (Tunis./Libya), I.C.J. Pleadings (6 Continental Shelf) map 95 (1981).
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1981 I.C.J. 3, 20 (April 14).
Id. at 23 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 62, 91 (Feb. 24).
Id. at 82.

ROBERT_f6-3305-3375 2/16/05 1:16 AM Page 3327

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

3327

third States.”92 At the time of writing, the envisioned delimitation with
third States has not yet occurred.
Libya v. Malta (Italy)93
Only months after the ICJ delivered its judgment in Tunisia v. Libya, Libya
and Malta submitted a Special Agreement requesting the Court to delimit
their continental shelf boundary. Libya v. Malta was similar to Tunisia v.
Libya in several respects. First, the geographic scope of the delimitation
was left undefined by the parties. In this regard, the Special Agreement
was nearly identical to that in Tunisia v. Libya requesting a “delimitation
of the area of the continental shelf which appertains to [the parties].”94
Second, third states – Italy and Tunisia – were present in the vicinity of
the requested delimitation. Third, Tunisia was apparently not concerned
that its interests might be prejudiced, while Italy was concerned enough to
attempt to intervene. Fourth, Italy’s intervention attempt, while ultimately
denied, gave Italy the opportunity to relate its interests to the Court.
During its intervention attempt Italy effectively conveyed to the Court
its interests in the area to be delimited through extensive oral pleadings,95
a map,96 and a written response to a question by Judge de Lacharrière
requesting more precise information about Italy’s area of interest.97 In response
to de Lacharrière’s request, Italy provided the exact lines of longitude that
defined the western limit of Italy’s area of interest east of the area to be
delimited – 15° 10' E – and the eastern limit of Italy’s area of interest west
of the area to be delimited – 13° 50' E. The Court explicitly adopted Italy’s
limits as the outer limits of the delimitation.98
Although the information available to the Court about third-state interests was qualitatively similar in Libya v. Malta and Tunisia v. Libya, that
is, a well-defined maximum claim of the intervening states, the Court

92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 93-94.
Report Number 8-8.
Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 16 (June 3).
See generally Oral Arguments on the Application by Italy for Permission to Intervene (Libya/
Malta), I.C.J. Pleadings (2 Continental Shelf).
Id. (5 Continental Shelf) map 25.
Letter from Italy Responding to Judge de Lacharriere (Libya/Malta), I.C.J. Pleadings (4
Continental Shelf) at 506-07 (1984).
“The limits within which the Court, in order to preserve the rights of third States, will confine
its decision in the present case, may thus be defined in terms of the claims of Italy.” Continental
Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 26 (June 3); See also id. map at 27.
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treated those interests differently in the two cases. While in Tunisia v.
Libya the Court defined an endpoint on an azimuth, in Libya v. Malta the
Court created endpoints precisely on the limits created by Italy’s maximum
claim and stopped its delimitation there.99 However, the Court did allude
to a possible Libya-Malta boundary relationship beyond the Court’s endpoints when it wrote, “no inference can be drawn from the fact that the
Court has taken into account the existence of Italian claims.”100 This
ambivalent endpoint approach appears to preserve for Libya and Malta the
option of a future extension beyond the Court’s endpoints.
Eritrea/Yemen (Saudi Arabia)101
In this two-stage case the parties requested an ad hoc tribunal first to
decide questions of territorial sovereignty over several disputed islands in
the Red Sea, and second to delimit the maritime boundary between the
parties taking into account the first-stage sovereignty award.102 Although
third-states were present at both ends of the delimitation area – Saudi
Arabia in the north and Djibouti in the south – the Arbitration Agreement
did not define the geographic limits of the delimitation area. To complicate
matters, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were engaged in a sovereignty dispute
over an island – Dhu Harab – which, if Saudi Arabia’s, would be the nearest Saudi territory to the delimitation area. A latent sovereignty dispute between
Eritrea and Djibouti over the islands of Dumeira and Callida may have
caused similar problems for the tribunal at the southern end of the delimitation area.103
Saudi Arabia, in an effort to protect its interests wrote to the tribunal
“suggesting that the Tribunal should restrict its decision to areas ‘that do
not extend north of the latitude of the most northern point on Jabal al Tayr
island’.”104 This latitude is approximately 15° 33' 40" N. In response to
Saudi Arabia’s suggestion and the views of the parties as to outer limits of

99
100
101
102
103

104

Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 28.
Report Number 6-14.
Arbitration Agreement (Eri./Yemen), 40 I.L.M. 983, 1014 (2001) (Oct. 3, 1996).
The written and oral pleadings of the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration are still confidential as per Art.
9.3 of the Arbitration Agreement, so it is difficult to know of what the tribunal was made aware.
See Chris M. Carleton, Region VII Report, infra (referring to potential sovereignty dispute
between Djibouti and Eritrea).
Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation) (Eri./Yemen), 40 ILM 983, 990
(2001), (Dec. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Eritrea/Yemen].
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the delimitation area, the tribunal stated that it “[had] taken into consideration these positions variously expressed and [had] reached its own conclusions.”105 Apparently the tribunal concluded that Saudi Arabia’s suggestion
was too protective and instead delimited the northern endpoint, point 1,
approximately 10 n.m. north of and beyond the suggested latitude.106
In establishing the location of the northern endpoint the tribunal
believed that it was “well short of where the boundary line might be disputed by any third State.”107 Few materials from the arbitration are publicly available, so it is difficult to know how the tribunal arrived at point
1.108 It is also not clear why the tribunal was so confident about the nonprejudicial location of point 1 in light of the Saudi letter. However, hindsight indicates that the tribunal was correct. Six months later Saudi Arabia
and Yemen concluded a maritime boundary agreement which resolved the
Dhu Harab sovereignty dispute in Yemen’s favor and created a maritime
boundary well north of point 1.109
Qatar v. Bahrain (Iran)110
In this case Qatar requested that the ICJ “draw in accordance with international law a single maritime boundary between the maritime areas of
sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters appertaining respectively to the
State of Qatar and the State of Bahrain.”111 The parties did not define the
outer limits of the delimitation area even though third states were present
at both ends – Iran in the north and Saudi Arabia in the south.
Iranian interests in the north were already defined by a pair of agreements – Bahrain-Iran and Iran-Qatar – that were concluded two decades

105
106

107
108

109
110
111

Id.
For starkly contrasting treatments of third-state interests, compare the tribunal’s response to
Saudi Arabia’s suggestion in Eritrea/Yemen with the Court’s response to Italy’s claims in Libya
v. Malta.
Id. at 1010. This was an odd conclusion considering that point 1 was far north of the limit
requested by Saudi Arabia.
Based on language in the Arbitration Award at paragraph 136 and some cursory geographic
analysis, this author suspects that the tribunal first constructed a median line using basepoints
that included the disputed features at either end of the delimitation area, but then stopped the
boundary at the first turning point influenced by a disputed feature. See id. at 1006. This theory
is born out for point 1 which is equidistant from a small Dahlak islet (Eritrea), Kutama Island
(Yemen), and Dhu Harab (Saudi Arabia/Yemen).
See Report Number 6-16.
Report Number 7-13.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, 49 (Mar. 16)
[hereinafter Qatar v. Bahrain].
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before Qatar brought this case.112 Therefore it was not necessary for Iran
to present its position, as it was already well known. Read together, these
agreements defined the maximum Iranian claim as against Bahrain and
Qatar, although the agreements left open where along the boundary with
Iran the interests of Bahrain would end and the interests of Qatar would
begin.
The Court delimited a boundary based primarily on equidistance. In
order to deal with the presence of Iran, the Court defined a penultimate
northern turning point, point 42, and then provided an azimuth to continue
the boundary beyond point 42. Specifically, the Court wrote: “Beyond
point 42, the single maritime boundary shall follow, in a north-north-easterly direction, a loxodrome having an azimuth of 12° 15' 12", until it
meets the delimitation line between the respective maritime zones of Iran
on the one hand and of Bahrain and Qatar on the other.”113 The Court’s
azimuth solution combined with the two preceding bilateral agreements, leaves
only minor technical issues to be resolved by the parties if they choose to
conclude a trilateral tripoint agreement.
Cameroon v. Nigeria (Equatorial Guinea)114
In this case Cameroon requested the ICJ to “determine the course of the
maritime boundary between the two States.”115 Equatorial Guinea’s Bioko
Island is located approximately 40 n.m. south of the disputed Bakassi Peninsula and the starting point of the maritime boundary. Nigeria’s maritime
boundary position was based on equidistance starting east of the Bakassi
Peninsula and continuing toward an equidistant tripoint among the parties
and Equatorial Guinea. The Nigerian position complemented to some
degree Nigeria’s previously delimited boundary with Equatorial Guinea.116
Cameroon’s maritime boundary position against Nigeria started on the west
side of the Bakassi Peninsula, cut between the coasts of Equatorial Guinea
and Nigeria, and continued out to sea to a distance of approximately 230
n.m. from the nearest point on the coast of Cameroon.117 By discounting,

112
113
114
115
116
117

Report Numbers 7-2, 7-6; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.
Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 111, at 116.
Report Number 4-1(Add. 2).
Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea intervening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 312
(Oct. 10) [hereinafter Cameroon v. Nigeria].
See Report Number 4-9.
Rejoinder of Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), at para. 12.23
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or entirely disregarding, the presence of Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon’s
position stood in stark contrast to the coastal geographic realities in the
area. Cameroon’s position also implied the absence of two features in the
political geographic landscape that were based on long-standing diplomatic
and oil concession practice among the three states: (1) an Equatorial
Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary relationship, and (2) a CameroonEquatorial Guinea-Nigeria tripoint relationship.
In order to protect its interests, Equatorial Guinea applied to intervene
in this case. For the first time in international maritime boundary dispute
settlement, the Court allowed the intervention. This gave Equatorial Guinea
the unique opportunity to make its interests known to the Court not only
through the intervention proceedings, as had Malta and Italy before it, but
also as a non-party intervenor in subsequent stages of the case. Throughout
the process Equatorial Guinea maintained that since it was not a party to
the case before the Court, the Court should not establish a NigeriaCameroon maritime boundary that fell within Equatorial Guinea’s equidistance line claim.
The Court, in formulating its maritime boundary judgment between
Cameroon and Nigeria, relied in the nearshore area on previous boundary
agreements between the parties. Further offshore, where these previous boundaries terminated, the Court continued the boundary on the basis of equidistance. In order to deal with Equatorial Guinea’s interests at the southern
end of the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary, the Court used the familiar
azimuth technique. The Court wrote: “In these circumstances the Court
considers that it can do no more than indicate a general direction, from
point X, of the boundary between the Parties’ maritime areas. The boundary will follow a loxodrome having an azimuth of 187° 52' 27".”118 The
Court added, “this equidistance line cannot be extended beyond a point
where it might affect rights of Equatorial Guinea.”119

118
119

(January 2001) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnframe.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2004).
Cameroon v. Nigeria, supra note 115, at 448.
Id. at 443.
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3 No Party-Defined Limits, Third-State Interests Unknown
Eritrea/Yemen (Djibouti)120
The geographic context of the southern end of this boundary delimitation
is described above in the section that covers Saudi Arabia’s interests in the
north. The main difference between the two endpoints is that in the south
Djibouti did not make its interests known to the tribunal.121 As with the
northern endpoint, the tribunal concluded that the southern endpoint, point
29, was “well short of where the boundary line might be disputed by any
third State.”122 Djibouti and Eritrea have yet to conclude their lateral
maritime boundary which could confirm or conflict with the tribunal’s
assertion.
Qatar v. Bahrain (Saudi Arabia)123
As stated above, the ICJ had to deal with the presence of Saudi Arabian
territory at the southern end of this boundary. However, unlike Iranian
interests in the north, which were clearly defined by two preceding boundary agreements, Saudi Arabia’s interests in the south were not known to
the Court. The only boundary agreement in the vicinity of the southern end
of the Qatar-Bahrain delimitation area was the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia
boundary which appears to be only partially delimited. There is no indication in the record that Saudi Arabia made its position known to the Court
during the proceedings between Bahrain and Qatar. In the absence of
defined Saudi Arabian interests in this area, the Court appears to have limited the delimitation to the area within an equidistant line between the parties and Saudi Arabia. In order to do this, the Court defined a penultimate
turning point that was closer to the coasts of the parties than to Saudi
Arabia, and then provided an azimuth from that turning point to take the
boundary toward the third state. The Court wrote: “Below point 1, the single maritime boundary shall follow, in a south-westerly direction, a loxodrome having an azimuth of 234° 16' 53", until it meets the delimitation
line between the respective maritime zones of Saudi Arabia on the one
hand and of Bahrain and Qatar on the other.”124

120
121
122
123
124

Report Number 6-14.
Eritrea/Yemen, supra note 104, at 990.
Id. at 1010.
Report Number 7-13.
Qatar v. Bahrain, supra note 111, at 116.
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4 Boundary Cases Currently Pending
At the time of this writing, three maritime boundary cases are on the ICJ
docket – Nicaragua v. Honduras,125 Nicaragua v. Colombia126 and Romania
v. Ukraine127 – all of which contain tripoint issues. There is a tripoint issue
in Nicaragua v. Honduras, but with which third state, Colombia or
Jamaica, will depend in part on the location of the Court’s line. In
Nicaragua v. Colombia, if the case proceeds to the merits, the Court will
probably be faced with more than one tripoint issue. Depending upon the
outcome of the island sovereignty question in that case and the direction
and location of the Court’s line, the interests of Costa Rica, Honduras,
Jamaica and Panama could be involved. The outcome in Nicaragua v. Colombia
could also have the effect of eliminating existing trilateral geographic relationships and their associated tripoints.128 There will be a tripoint issue at
the seaward end of the delimitation in Romania v. Ukraine. It will most
likely be with Turkey, but Bulgaria is also in the vicinity.
Also at the time of this writing, three UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration
tribunals have been formed to decide maritime boundary questions:
Malaysia/Singapore (in part), Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago 129 and
Guyana/Suriname.130 It is possible that tripoint issues will arise in the case
between Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia, in its notification and statement of claim, requested the arbitral tribunal, among other things, “to
delimit the boundary between the territorial waters of the two States in the
area beyond Points W25 and E47 of the 1995 Agreement.”131 Delimitations
based on a broad interpretation of “between the territorial waters” would
quickly approach Indonesia’s interests at both ends of the Johor Strait, but
would remain well short of the sovereignty dispute between Malaysia and
Singapore over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, which is currently before
the ICJ.
In Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago, if Barbados requests a complete
delimitation, tripoint issues will arise at both ends of the Barbados-

125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Report Number 2-24.
Report Number 2-25.
Report Number 8-17.
See Report Numbers 2-1, 2-4, 2-5, 2-18.
Report Number 2-26.
Report Number 3-10.
Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor/ Request for Provisional
Measures (Malay. v. Sing.), ITLOS Case No. 12 (Order of Oct. 8, 2003) at 7. Available at
http://www.itlos.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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Trinidad and Tobago boundary. The western endpoint will probably involve
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the eastern endpoint either Venezuela
or Guyana. In the east, the tribunal will also be faced with two existing
maritime delimitations, which are themselves in direct conflict – Trinidad
and Tobago-Venezuela and Barbados-Guyana.132
In order to determine the geographic scope of the delimitation in
Guyana/Suriname one must consider the long-standing sovereignty dispute
between Guyana and Venezuela over the Essequibo region. The tribunal
will not be asked to decide this issue, but the ongoing dispute has a direct
impact on potential tripoint issues. If the disputed region, and its coastline,
is Venezuela’s, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela would have a coastal
geographic relationship that indicates a potential tripoint within 200 n.m.
of their coasts. If the disputed region is Guyana’s, a potential tripoint
would not arise until much farther out to sea, if at all.

II THE TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of the trilateral perspective is to understand the status and
estimate the location of tripoints on the basis of information provided by
the coastal geography and the delimitation behavior of the relevant states.
A tripoint can be either an actual tripoint, that is a delimited and agreed
tripoint, or a potential tripoint, that is a geographically possible but not yet
trilaterally agreed tripoint. A potential tripoint remains a purely theoretical
entity until it is turned into an actual tripoint through a trilateral agreement
among, and binding on, all three parties. At the time of this writing, only
eight such agreements exist.133 With those exceptions all other tripoints discussed in this report are merely potential tripoints.
In order to analyze and classify their trilateral aspects, this study uses
a five-tiered ranking system based on the certainty and location of the 127
actual and potential tripoints indicated by agreements reported in Volumes
I-V of this series. Each of these tripoints has been assigned a rank in light
of existing bilateral and trilateral agreements. The results are found in the
accompanying table. The most certain category is actual tripoints. The four
remaining categories are of potential tripoints in descending order of certainty: presumed tripoints, probable tripoints, uncertain tripoints, and conflict-

132
133

Report Numbers 2-13, 2-27.
See supra note 19.
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ing tripoints. In Sections A through E below each category is described.
As with the delimitation techniques described in this paper, a stylized symbol is used to represent each category.134 Section F addresses briefly the
role of joint zones in tripoint creation and analysis.

A Actual Tripoint •
Actual tripoints are tripoints that have been defined and agreed in a trilateral treaty. These are the most certain of tripoints but are fairly uncommon.
Only eight have been completed at the time of this writing: four in the
eastern Indian Ocean, three in the Baltic Sea, and one in the Caspian Sea.
Of these tripoint agreements, five were concluded only after, or simultaneously with, the conclusion of the three associated bilateral agreements.135 The
other three tripoint agreements were concluded before all three bilateral
agreements had been concluded.136
Some tripoint agreements delimit both the tripoint itself and the final
segments of one or more of the associated bilateral agreements.137 The language in Article 1 of the Poland-Sweden-Soviet Union treaty is typical of
this type of tripoint agreement. It states: “From the points indicated below
[providing the endpoint names and coordinates of the three preceding bilateral agreements] the delimitation line continues along straight lines (geodetic lines) to the junction point.”138 Other tripoint agreements delimit only
134
135

136

137

138

These symbols appear in the accompanying table and should give the user a visual cue for
quickly identifying tripoints within a certain category.
Report Numbers 6-7 (India-Indonesia-Thailand), 6-11 (Add. 1) (India-Myanmar (Burma)Thailand), 10-12 (Poland-Russia-Sweden), 10-21 (Estonia-Finland-Sweden), 11-4 (AzerbaijanKazakhstan-Russia).
The India-Maldives-Sri Lanka, India-Malaysia-Thailand, and the Estonia-Latvia-Sweden tripoint
agreements are examples of agreements reached before all three bilateral agreements were concluded. Report Numbers 6-9, 6-12, 10-17. In fact, the India-Maldives-Sri Lanka tripoint agreement was concluded with only the India-Sri Lanka boundary agreement in place. Maldives and
Sri Lanka have yet to conclude their maritime boundary nearly thirty years after the tripoint
agreement was signed. Report Numbers 6-8, 6-9, 6-10(2). The Estonia-Latvia-Sweden tripoint
agreement was concluded after only the Estonia-Latvia agreement had been concluded. The
bilateral agreement between Estonia and Sweden was concluded about eighteen months after the
tripoint agreement, and Latvia and Sweden have not yet delimited their boundary. Report
Numbers 10-15, 10-17, 10-19.
For example, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand tripoint agreement creates final segments radiating from the tripoint out to, or at least toward in the case of the Malaysia-Thailand boundary,
the endpoints on previously delimited bilateral boundaries. Report Numbers 5-9, 5-13(1), 6-12,
6-13. The other tripoint agreements that use this technique are India-Indonesia-Thailand, EstoniaFinland-Sweden, Estonia-Latvia-Sweden, Poland-Russia-Sweden.
Report Number 10-12 at 2103-04.
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the tripoint and, where necessary, leave the parties to extend their boundaries to the tripoint in future bilateral delimitations.139 Article 1 of the
India-Maldives-Sri Lanka treaty provides an example of this type of agreement. It states: “The tri-junction point . . . shall be the point . . . defined by
latitude and longitude as follows.”140

B Presumed Tripoint ••
In a slightly larger category are presumed tripoints. This study has identified 14 presumed tripoints. Some presumed tripoints consist of three coincident endpoints in the three associated bilateral treaties. Despite apparent
agreement, these are still only presumed tripoints because they lack a trilateral agreement to tie them together.141 Other presumed tripoints are
formed by three nearly coincident endpoints – endpoints that would be
precisely coincident but for minor discrepancies in the horizontal datums
or endpoint coordinates among the triplet of bilateral agreements.142 Despite these minor discrepancies, it is fairly clear that in these situations the
parties intended to create coincident endpoints.143
Included in this category are those tripoints that are formed descriptively rather than with endpoint coordinates, but which lead to only one
possible location for the potential tripoint. The two Colombia-Costa RicaPanama tripoints are examples of this type of presumed tripoint. In the
Caribbean the first of the three associated bilateral agreements, between
139
140
141

142

143

Report Numbers 6-9 (India-Maldives-Sri Lanka), 6-11(Add. 1) (India-Myanmar (Burma)Thailand), 11-4 (Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Russia).
Report Number 6-9 at 1407.
The potential tripoint among Denmark (Greenland), Iceland and Norway (Jan Mayen), represents
an extreme example of a tripoint that remains merely a presumed tripoint despite obvious agreement among the three states as to its status and location. Here, the three relevant bilateral agreements were signed on the same date, in the same place, and as a result of trilateral consultations;
each identifies the same point as the tripoint; each identifies the third state in the text of the
agreement; and each makes entry into force of the bilateral agreement contingent on notification
by the third state that the determination of the tripoint has been confirmed. However, no trilateral agreement exists among the three states. Report Numbers 9-4(2), 9-19(2), 9-22.
For example, Australia-France (New Caledonia) point R1 and Australia-Solomon Islands point
R1 are both referenced to WGS 72. This same point referenced to WGS 84 has coordinates 15°
44' 06.8633" S, 158° 45' 39.5540" E. This is approximately 17 meters northeast of France (New
Caledonia)-Solomon Islands point 23 at 15° 44' 07" S, 158° 45' 39" E which is referenced to
WGS 84. Report Numbers 5-1, 5-4, 5-17.
For this study 100 meters was chosen as the arbitrary cut off between nearly coincident and not
coincident. Endpoints that are more than 100 meters apart are not considered to be coincident.
See, for example the endpoints of the Cape Verde-Senegal and Cape Verde-Mauritania agreements, which are approximately 150 meters apart. Report Numbers 4-8(Vol. III), 4-12.
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Colombia and Panama, described the final segment of the boundary as
“[f]rom Point M [11° 00' 00" N, 81° 15' 00" W], the delimitation continues along a straight line by azimuth 225 (45° southwest) until a point
where the maritime limits with a third State should be made.”144 The next
associated boundary, between Colombia and Costa Rica, used a similar description and added the latitude at which the Colombia-Panama boundary would
meet the Colombia-Costa Rica boundary.145 The third boundary of the
triplet, between Costa Rica and Panama, then identified the coordinates of
the presumed tripoint and described it as “where the boundaries of Costa
Rica, Colombia, and Panama intersect.”146 A similar set of boundaries
defined the Colombia-Costa Rica-Panama tripoint in the Pacific Ocean.147
The Bahrain-Iran-Qatar tripoint represents yet another version of a presumed tripoint. When combined, the Bahrain-Iran boundary and the IranQatar boundary created a line segment along which the tripoint must be
located.148 The Court’s decision in Qatar v. Bahrain, without defining the
tripoint in terms of coordinates, provided enough information (the coordinates of the penultimate turning point and an azimuth) to locate the presumed tripoint along the previously defined line segment.149 Despite the
fact that none of the three bilateral boundaries provides the coordinates of
its endpoint, the Bahrain-Iran-Qatar tripoint is a presumed tripoint because
identifying the coordinates “should be no more than a technical exercise.”150

C Probable Tripoint
Probable tripoints are those for which two of three boundaries have been
completed and contain either precisely coincident endpoints,151 nearly coincident endpoints,152 or are described in a way that could lead to only one

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

152

Report Number 2-5 at 533.
“[T]he intersection of a straight line, drawn with azimuth 225° (45° SW) from [11° 00' 00" N,
81° 15' 00" W], with the parallel 10° 49' 00" N.” Report Number 2-1 at 474.
The coordinates of the presumed tripoint are 10° 49' 00" N, 81° 26' 08.2" W. Report Number
2-6 at 548.
See Report Numbers 2-5, 2-6, 3-6 (Add. 1, Corr. 1).
Report Numbers 7-2, 7-6.
Report Number 7-13.
Carleton, supra note 103, in this volume.
The Colombia-Dominican Republic-Haiti tripoint is an example of precisely coincident endpoints. The Colombia-Dominican Republic boundary and the Colombia-Haiti boundary both contain endpoints located at 15° 02' 00" N, 73° 27' 30" W. Report Numbers 2-2, 2-3.
The Cuba-Haiti-Jamaica tripoint is an example of nearly coincident endpoints. The Cuba-Haiti
endpoint is 18° 49' 55.74" N, 75° 30' 23.50" W, while the Cuba-Jamaica endpoint is 18° 49' 56"
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tripoint location.153 This study identifies 15 probable tripoints. These potential tripoints at least indicate agreement between two of the three states
involved. Once the third agreement is completed, one of four things is
likely to happen to the probable tripoint. First, the third agreement could
provide an endpoint that is coincident with the endpoints of the previous
two agreements. This would elevate the probable tripoint to a presumed tripoint. Second, the third agreement could fall short of the previous agreements. The probable tripoint would then remain a probable tripoint until
further delimitation activity. Third, the third agreement could overstep one
or both of the previous two agreements. This would downgrade the probable tripoint to a conflicting tripoint. Or, fourth, the third agreement could
end on one of the two previously defined bilateral boundaries, but not at
the location of the coincident endpoints. This would have the effect of
shifting the potential tripoint location along a previously agreed line but
without overstepping it and without creating a conflicting tripoint. This
third possibility would also elevate the newly located potential tripoint to
a presumed tripoint.154

D Uncertain Tripoint
This is the largest category of potential tripoints. This study identifies 86
uncertain tripoints. Uncertain tripoints include those for which only one of
three boundaries has been completed. In these single boundary situations
little information is available about the position of the third state with
regard to the endpoint of the single completed boundary. Uncertain tripoints also include those for which two or even all three associated bilateral boundaries have been completed, but completed so that all of them fall
short of each other. Although this narrows the area in which the tripoint is
likely to fall, it leaves the outside observer with limited information as to
the final location of the potential tripoint within that area.

153

154

N, 75° 30' 23" W. Assuming both endpoints are referenced to the same datum, they would be
less than 17 meters apart. Report Numbers 2-7, 2-19.
The Dominica-France (Guadelope)-Venezuela (Aves) tripoint is an example. The boundary
between France and Venezuela is only defined as the meridian 62° 48' 50" W without specified
endpoints, and the endpoint of the Dominica-France boundary incorporates that meridian in its
coordinates: 15° 03' 54" N, 62° 48' 50" W. Report Numbers 2-11, 2-15.
See, for example, the Belgium-Netherlands-United Kingdom tripoint. The first two agreements
– Netherlands-United Kingdom and Belgium-United Kingdom – shared coincident endpoints at
51° 48' 18" N, 02° 28' 54" E. Report Numbers 9-13, 9-17. However, the third boundary in the
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As with probable tripoints, subsequent delimitations can impact the status of uncertain tripoints. A second delimitation in the vicinity of an uncertain tripoint could create a coincident endpoint and elevate the tripoint to
a probable tripoint. It could overstep the first delimitation and downgrade
the uncertain tripoint to a conflicting tripoint. The second delimitation
could also create an endpoint that falls on the first boundary, but not at the
original endpoint. This would have the double effect of shifting the potential tripoint along the first boundary and of elevating its status to a probable tripoint.155

E Conflicting Tripoint
The conflicting tripoint category is, surprisingly, the smallest of the five.156
There appear to be only five conflicting tripoints. Conflicting tripoints arise
in trilateral geographic relationships in which two or three of the associated bilateral agreements have been concluded and in which the endpoints
of at least two of the agreements overstep each other. This is the current
situation among Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni), Gabon and Sao Tome and
Principe. Sao Tome and Principe has delimited boundaries with both Equatorial
Guinea and Gabon, but has done so in a way that creates overstepping
endpoints. The Gabon-Sao Tome and Principe endpoint is approximately
seven n.m. north of and beyond the Equatorial Guinea-Sao Tome and

155

156

triplet – Belgium-Netherlands – ended at 51° 52' 34.012" N, 02° 32' 21.599" E. Report Number
9-21. The endpoint of the third agreement is located on the Netherlands-United Kingdom boundary and is the presumed tripoint among the three states.
This scenario unfolded during the boundary negotiations between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria.
Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe had already agreed to a boundary with an endpoint designated as point 15. The negotiations between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria resulted
in a boundary with an endpoint (point x) that is not coincident with point 15, but which does
fall on the previously agreed boundary with Sao Tome and Principe. Therefore the potential
Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe tripoint shifted from an uncertain tripoint at
point 15 to a probable tripoint at point x. Report Numbers 4-8 (Vol. IV), 4-9.
The accompanying table addresses only tripoints that are actively in dispute as manifested by
conflicting delimited maritime boundaries. Certainly there are many more latent disputed tripoints that have not made the list because they do not have associated overstepping agreements.
The sovereignty and maritime boundary dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua is just one
example of a situation in which there are several latently disputed tripoints. Both Colombia and
Nicaragua claim sovereignty over islands that were the territorial basis for several of Colombia’s
maritime boundaries and their associated potential tripoints. Therefore, the sovereignty dispute
between Colombia and Nicaragua indicates a latent dispute over the Colombia-HondurasNicaragua, Colombia-Honduras-Jamaica, Colombia-Costa Rica-Panama, and Colombia-Costa
Rica-Nicaragua tripoints.
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Principe endpoint.157 A similar situation has been created among Colombia,
Haiti and Jamaica,158 and among the Dominican Republic, the United
States (Puerto Rico) and Venezuela.159 In order for this to occur, one of the
three states must agree to a boundary with one neighbor that conflicts with
a boundary already delimited with another neighbor. There is either an element of bad faith or lack of attention to detail in this practice. It may be
that there are so few conflicting tripoints because states are generally reluctant to engage in inconsistent boundary delimitation behavior vis-à-vis their
neighbors.
Conflicting tripoints also arise in quadrilateral geographic configurations. For example, the Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela boundary, which
appears to presume no tripoint relationship with either of the nearest
coastal states, Barbados to the north and Guyana to the south, is clearly in
conflict with the Barbados-Guyana Co-operation Zone agreement, which
appears to presume no Venezuelan presence in that zone.160

F Tripoints and Joint Zones Z
The presence of a joint zone in the vicinity of a potential tripoint can further confuse an already uncertain situation. Because a joint zone creates an
area between two of the three relevant states, instead of a line, joint zones
obscure tripoint relationships without contributing much useful information
about endpoints. Nonetheless, joint zones are part of the tripoint picture
and merit some discussion here if only to clarify how they are approached
in the accompanying table.
Of the joint zones in the world, nine are associated with potential tripoints.161 Only two of these zones are part of a larger boundary agreement,162 while the other seven occur in the absence of any maritime
boundary between the parties to the joint zone. However, with or without
an accompanying boundary, a joint zone indicates the existence of one of
the three bilateral boundary relationships required to create a potential tri-

157
158
159
160
161

162

Report Numbers 4-8, 4-11.
Report Numbers 2-3, 2-18.
Report Numbers 2-9, 2-14.
Report Numbers 2-13, 2-27.
Report Numbers 2-18 (Colombia-Jamaica), 2-27 (Barbados-Guyana), 4-11 (Nigeria-Sao Tome
and Principe), 5-12 (Japan-South Korea), 5-13 (Malaysia-Thailand), 5-19 (Malaysia-Vietnam),
5-21 (Cambodia-Vietnam), 5-24 (Cambodia-Thailand), 6-15 (Australia-East Timor),
Report Numbers 2-18 (Colombia-Jamaica), 5-12 (Japan-South Korea).

ROBERT_f6-3305-3375 2/16/05 1:16 AM Page 3341

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

3341

point and serves as a placeholder for a possible future boundary. Therefore,
joint zones are included in the accompanying table.
Joint zones do not have identifiable endpoints, and are therefore of relatively little assistance in identifying tripoint locations or understanding tripoint status. For that reason, the presence of joint zones was disregarded
when determining the appropriate tripoint classification for potential tripoints with associated joint zones. Instead, with two exceptions, only the
tripoint information available from the non-zone boundary agreements
associated with each tripoint was considered. The first exception was for
the China-Japan-South Korea tripoint which was included in the table
solely on the basis of the Japan-South Korea Joint Development Zone. The
second exception was for the potential “tripoint” among Barbados, Guyana,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, which is classified as a conflicting
tripoint on the basis of the relationship between the Trinidad and TobagoVenezuela boundary and the Barbados-Guyana Cooperation Zone.
Of the potential tripoints with associated joint zones, one is a conflicting tripoint, seven are uncertain tripoints, and one is a probable tripoint.

III CONCLUSION

Tripoints are like glue – while they can provide the adhesive to cement
three separate bilateral agreements together, they can also make things very
sticky. Tripoint issues make things sticky for parties to bilateral boundary
negotiations – so sticky that the parties are often unable to delimit the
entire length of their boundary until the third state is brought in through
associated bilateral agreements or through a trilateral agreement. Tripoint
issues also make things sticky for judges and arbitrators faced with the
presence of a third state in the vicinity of the requested delimitation – a
stickiness created by the tension between the court’s “duty to decide the
whole of the petitum entrusted to it; that is, to indicate the line of the frontier between the Parties over the entire length of the disputed area,”163 and
the court’s reluctance to prejudice the interests of non-party, third states.
As discussed in the body of this report, there are various ways around
sticky tripoint issues. An increasingly popular approach, especially among
dispute settlement bodies, is to define the penultimate turning point and an

163

Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali) 1986 I.C.J. 554, 579 (Dec. 22).
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azimuth from that point toward the third state. Another is to define an endpoint, recognizing that further, probably trilateral, negotiations will be required
to continue beyond that point toward a tripoint. Yet another is to define an
endpoint recognizing that its location may recede as a result of future
negotiations.
Ultimately, tripoint issues will arise for the majority of states with
undelimited or incompletely delimited maritime boundaries. As such, states
and dispute settlement bodies will continue to address tripoint issues, and
the state practice and jurisprudence of tripoints will continue to grow.
There are many presumed tripoints that are ripe for a trilateral agreement
to tidy up the boundary relationships. There are also many probable tripoints waiting for the third boundary in their triplet to come along and
clarify matters. While progress towards clarity is made on these fronts,
latent tripoint disputes will undoubtedly become overt and probable tripoints will be foiled by overstepping. We can hope that the net result will
be a move toward clarity and peaceful resolution of undelimited maritime
boundaries and their associated tripoints.

EXPLANATORY LIST OF TERMS USED IN THE TABLE

Rank The status (actual, presumed, probable, uncertain and conflicting) of
each tripoint is indicated by the symbol in the “rank” column. A detailed
description of each status level is provided in the body of this report.
Every attempt has been made to apply the ranking system consistently
across the 127 actual and potential tripoints considered in this table.
Actual or Potential Tripoint The names of the three states involved in
an actual or potential tripoint related to one or more of the bilateral boundary agreements reported in Volumes I-V of this series are provided in the
“actual or potential tripoint” column. The tripoints are alphabetized within
each of the eleven regions. Where a specific part of a state’s territory is
responsible for creating the tripoint relationship, the name of that territory
is given in parentheses.164 Where it is not clear with which third state a

164

See, for example, France (Martinique)-St. Lucia-Venezuela (Aves). Where three states have multiple tripoint relationships, north, south, east and west have been used to distinguish among
them. Among Australia, East Timor and Indonesia, the potential continental shelf and exclusive
economic zone tripoints are in different locations. The abbreviations “CS” and “EEZ” have been
used to distinguish these tripoints.

ROBERT_f6-3305-3375 2/16/05 1:16 AM Page 3343

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

3343

tripoint relationship exists, the names of likely third states are shown in
italics.165
Endpoint Technique The endpoint technique used by the parties is indicated by the symbol in the “endpoint technique” column. A detailed
description of each technique is provided in the body of this report. As
with the application of the ranking system, every attempt has been made
to apply these five endpoint techniques consistently across all of the endpoints considered in this table.
Associated Bilateral Relationships The three bilateral relationships associated with each tripoint are indicated in the “associated bilateral relationships” column. The relationships are listed in chronological order on the
basis of signature date, or date of judgment. In some situations the same
two parties have concluded two agreements sequentially in order to arrive
at their current endpoint position. Where this is important to the tripoint
analysis, both agreements are listed.166 Where boundary agreements follow
judgments, as occurred after several ICJ cases, the date of the judgment
and the date of the agreement are both provided. The boundary report
number for each bilateral agreement is provided in parentheses. Associated
bilateral relationships that have not yet resulted in an agreement appear in
this column in italics.
Remarks The information provided in the “remarks” column has been
extracted from the texts of boundary agreements and judgments provided
in Volumes I-V of this series.167 Where the endpoint information consists
only of coordinates, those have been provided in a standardized format.168

165

166
167
168

See, for example, North Korea-Russia-Japan or South Korea.
For the purpose of this table the “likeliness” of a tripoint relationship among two parties to a
bilateral agreement and one or more states in the vicinity of that agreement has been determined
only in terms of general coastal relationships. No systematic geodetic measurements have been
made to find equidistant tripoint locations, nor have detailed studies been made of all sovereignty disputes that could impact tripoint relationships. There has been no intention to support
or endorse territorial claims or boundary positions in the choice of the states likely to be
involved in a tripoint relationship.
See, for example, the two agreements between India and Sri Lanka – one before and one after
the conclusion of the India-Maldives-Sri Lanka tripoint agreement.
In order to provide important endpoint-related language, it was necessary to go outside the pages
of this series to the full text of the judgments in Libya v. Malta and Eritrea/Yemen.
Standardizing the coordinates has involved inserting symbols in place of the words “degrees,”
“minutes” and “seconds,” and, where the intention of the parties appears unambiguous, moving
the location of minute and second symbols to their appropriate locations. Only in the case of
the India-Maldives-Sri Lanka tripoint and its associated boundaries was it impossible to ascertain the appropriate format.
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Where additional endpoint information is available in the treaty or judgment text, it has been quoted faithfully from the pages of this series.169 The
page numbers are provided in parentheses.
Secession and Unification The break ups of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, and East Timor’s independence have created several new tripoint relationships. It is assumed for the purpose of this table that states
formed by these dissolutions, unless they have declared otherwise, are successors to the boundary agreements of their predecessor state. Russia,170
Ukraine171 and Georgia172 are considered to be successor states to the
Soviet Union. Likewise, Slovenia,173 Croatia,174 and Serbia and Montenegro
are considered to be successor states to Yugoslavia. Where specific endpoint information is available, it has been included in the table. Where successors have succeeded to the “relevant part” of a preexisting boundary
without further defining that part, the page numbers of the preexisting
boundary have been provided.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have indicated that they are not successors to the Soviet Union.175 Therefore, the boundaries of the Soviet Union
in the Baltic Sea with Finland and Sweden have not been attributed to
them in the accompanying table. Similarly, East Timor claims to be a suc-

169

170

171

172
173

174

175

In the interest of space the language is abridged to include only information directly relevant to
the topic at hand. This has resulted in some disjointed sentences. The reader is encouraged to
study the complete texts at the page numbers indicated.
“[T]he Russian Federation continues to exercise its rights and honour its commitments deriving
from international treaties concluded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Report
Number 8-10(4) at 2443. It should be assumed that this statement applies to all of Russia’s
boundary relationships including with Turkey in the Black Sea, North Korea in the Sea of Japan,
and Finland, Sweden and Poland in the Baltic Sea. See Report Number 8-10(4) regarding the
boundary relationship between Russia and Turkey. See Report Number 10-14 regarding Russia’s
successor state status in the Baltic Sea.
“Ukraine, in accordance with international law and with its legislation, is a successor state of
the [Soviet Union] equally with all other states of the [Soviet Union].” Report Number 8-10(4)
at 2445.
Report Number 8-10(5).
“The state frontiers of the Republic of Slovenia are the internationally recognized state frontiers
between the hitherto SFRY and . . . the Republic of Italy . . . in that part of the frontier in which
these states border on the Republic of Slovenia.” Report Number 8-7(3) at 2440.
“International agreements concluded and acceded to by the SFRY shall apply in the Republic of
Croatia . . . on the basis of the provisions of the international law on state succession relating to
international agreements. . . . The state boundaries of the Republic of Croatia are the internationally recognized state boundaries of the present-day SFRY in the part which relates to the
Republic of Croatia.” Report Number 8-7(3) at 2441-42.
Report Number 10-14 at p. 2562. See also Erik Franckx, Region X Report, infra.
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cessor to Portugal, not to Indonesia.176 Therefore, the boundaries between
Australia and Indonesia have not been attributed to East Timor in the table
below, except where they have been renegotiated by East Timor.177
Unification can have the opposite effect on tripoint relationships. German
unification eliminated a potential tripoint among Denmark, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

176
177

Report Number 6-15 at 2756-57.
Report Number 6-15, 6-20.

Pt. 1: 20° 22' 24.76" N, 73° 34' 56.48" W (p. 561)

Pt. L18: 14° 06' 51" N, 59° 59' 59" W (p. 600)

France-St. Lucia (2-10) [1981]
Barbados-France
Barbados-St. Lucia

Barbados-France
(Martinique)-St. Lucia

“[T]he delimitation . . . from point 8 [18° 18' 29" N, 62° 13' 59" W]
to the tripoint [with Antigua and Barbuda] shall be completed at
and appropriate time.” (p. 2225)

“[T]he delimitation between point 5 [16° 39' 28" N, 61° 51' 04" W]
and the tripoint [with Antigua and Barbuda] shall be completed at
the appropriate time.” (p. 2232-33)

Pt. 1: 23° 55' 30" N, 81° 12' 55" W (p. 423)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Cuba-Haiti (2-7) [1977]
Bahamas-Cuba
Bahamas-Haiti

Antigua and Barbuda-France
Antigua and Barbuda-United
Kingdom

France-United Kingdom
(2-20) [1996]

Antigua and Barbuda-France
Antigua and Barbuda-United
Kingdom

France-United Kingdom
(2-21) [1996]

Cuba-United States (1-4) [1977]
Bahamas-United States
Bahamas-Cuba

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Bahamas-Cuba-Haiti

Antigua and BarbudaFrance (St.
Barthelemy)-United
Kingdom (Anguilla)

Antigua and BarbudaFrance (Guadeloupe)United Kingdom
(Montserrat)

Region II. Middle America/The Caribbean

Bahamas-Cuba-United
States

Region I. North America

Endpoint
Tech.
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Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Z

Barbados-GuyanaTrinidad and Tobago
or Venezuela

Colombia-Dominican
Republic-Haiti

Colombia-Costa RicaPanama

Colombia-Costa RicaNicaragua

Trinidad and TobagoVenezuela-Barbados
or Guyana

Endpoint
Tech.

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Colombia-Dominican Republic
(2-2) [1978]
Colombia-Haiti (2-3) [1978]
Dominicani Republic-Haiti

Costa Rica-Panama (2-6) [1980]

Colombia-Costa Rica
(2-1) [1977]

Colombia-Panama (2-5) [1976]

Colombia-Nicaragua (2-25)
Costa Rica-Nicaragua

Colombia-Costa Rica
(2-1) [1977]

Trinidad and Tobago-Barbados
(2-26) or
Trinidad and Tobago-Guyana
Venezuela-Barbados or
Venezuela-Guayana

Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela
(2-13(3)) [1990]

Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago
(2-26) or Barbados-Venezuela
Guyana-Trinidad and Tobago or
Guyana-Venezuela

Barbados-Guyana (2-27) [2003]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

Pt. 2: 15° 02' 00" N, 73° 27' 30" W (p. 501)

western point: 15° 02' 00" N, 73° 27' 30" W (p. 489)

“From Point M [11° 00' 00" N, 81° 15' 00" W], the delimitation
continues along a straight line by azimuth 225 (45° southwest)
until a point where the maritime limits with a third State should be
made.” (p. 533)
“[T]he intersection of a straight line, drawn with azimuth 225° (45°
SW) from [11° 00' 00" N, 81° 15' 00" W], with the parallel 10° 49'
00" N.” (p. 474)
“[A] point [10° 49' 00" N, 81° 26' 08.2" W] where the boundaries
of Costa Rica, Colombia, and Panama intersect.” (p. 548)

“From [10° 49' 00" N, 82° 14' 00" W], the boundary shall continue
north along the said meridian to where delimitation must be made
with a third State.” (p. 474)

“[F]rom point 21 [10° 16' 01" N, 58° 49' 12" W] along an azimuth
of 067 degrees up to the outer limit of the [EEZ] and thereafter
towards point 22 [11° 24' 00" N, 56° 06' 30" w].” (p. 686)

Co-operation Zone (in this volume)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Pt. 1: 14° 59' 08" N, 82° 00' 00 " W (p. 517)

Pt. 51: 18° 49' 55.74" N, 75° 30' 23.50" W (p. 562)
Pt. 1: 18° 49' 56" N, 75° 30' 23" W (p. 2214)

Pt. 13: 19° 32' 25.80" N, 84° 38' 30.66" W (p. 576)

Cuba-Haiti (2-7) [1977]
Cuba-Jamaica (2-19) [1994]
Haiti-Jamaica
Cuba-Mexico (2-8) [1976]
Cuba-Honduras
Honduras-Mexico

Cuba-Haiti-Jamaica

Cuba-HondurasMexico

Honduras-Jamaica

Colombia-Jamaica (2-18) [1993]

“From [16° 04' 15" N, 79° 50' 32" W], the marine frontier shall
continue towards the east by parallel 16° 04' 15 " N, up to the
point where a delimitation must be made with a third State.”
(p. 517)
Joint Regime Area (p. 2201)

Pt. 1: 14° 44' 10 " N, 74° 30' 50 " W (p. 501)
“From Point 4 [14° 44' 10" N, 74° 30' 50 " W], the delimitation line
proceeds by a geodesic line in the direction to another point [15°
02' 00" N, 73° 27' 30" W], as far as the delimitation line between
Colombia and Haiti is intercepted by the delimitation line to be
decided between Jamaica and Haiti.” (p. 2200)

“[T]hrough [15° 00' 40" N, 71° 40' 30 " W], towards [15° 18' 00" N,
69° 29' 30" W] up to where the delimitation must be made with a
third state.” (p. 489)
“[F]rom point 6 [14° 57' 52" N, 71° 24' 19" W], a constant true
course following azimuth 270° 68", . . . to another point where the
delimitation must be made with a Third State.” (p. 589)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Colombia-Nicaragua (2-25)
Colombia-Nicaragua (2-24)

Z

Colombia-Honduras (2-4) [1986]

Haiti-Jamaica

Colombia-Haiti (2-3) [1978]
Colombia-Jamaica (2-18) [1993]

Colombia-Venezuela

Dominican Republic-Venezuela
(2-9) [1979]

Colombia-Dominican Republic
(2-2) [1978]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Colombia-HondurasNicaragua

Colombia-HondurasJamaica

Colombia-HaitiJamaica

Endpoint
Tech.

3348

Colombia-Dominican
Republic-Venezuela

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Pt. 13: 15° 14' 28" N, 68° 51' 44" W (p. 633)

Netherlands-Venezuela
(2-12) [1978]
Dominican Republic-Venezuela
(2-9) [1979]
Dominican Republic-Netherlands

Dominican RepublicNetherlands (Antilles)Venezuela (East)

Pt. 7: 15° 14' 28" N, 68° 51' 44" W (p. 589)

Pt. 1: 20° 32' 43" N, 72° 08' 50" W (p. 2243)

Dominican Republic-United
Kingdom
(2-22) [1996]
Dominican Republic-Haiti
Haiti-United Kingdom

Dominica-France (2-15) [1987]
Dominica-Venezuela

Dominican RepublicHaiti-United Kingdom
(Turks and Caicos)

“The maritime delineation line . . . is constituted by the meridian
[62° 48' 50" W].” (p. 613)
Pt. 1: 15° 03' 54" N, 62° 48' 50" W (p. 714)

“The maritime delineation line . . . is constituted by the meridian
[62° 48' 50 " W].” (p. 613)
Pt. 14: 14° 29' 19" N, 62° 48' 50" W (p. 715)

Dominica-France (2-15) [1987]
Dominica-Venezuela

France-Venezuela (2-11) [1980]

“From point 106 [19° 15' 47 " N, 78° 22' 09" W], the delimitation
line proceeds by a geodesic line in a westerly direction to a point
to be determined by subsequent agreement.” (p. 2217)

Pt. A: 19° 27' 57" N, 83° 35' 50" W (in this volume)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

France-Venezuela (2-11) [1980]

Dominica-France
(Martinique)Venezuela

Dominica-France
(Guadeloupe)Venezuela (Aves)

Cuba-United Kingdom
Jamaica-United Kingdom

Cuba-Jamaica (2-19) [1994]

Cuba-Jamaica-United
Kingdom (Cayman
Islands)

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
Honduras-United Kingdom
(2-23) [2001]
Cuba-Honduras
Cuba-United Kingdom

Endpoint
Tech.

Cuba-Honduras-United
Kingdom (Cayman
Islands)

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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France (St. Martin)Netherlands (Saba)United Kingdom
(Anguilla)

France (Martinique)-St.
Lucia-Venezuela
(Ave s)

France (Guadeloupe)United Kingdom
(Montserrat)Venezuela (Aves)

Dominican RepublicUnited States (Puerto
Rico)-Venezuela

Dominican RepublicNetherlands (Antilles)Venezuela (West)

Endpoint
Tech.

France-Netherlands
Netherlands-United Kingdom

France-United Kingdom
(2-20) [1996]

St. Lucia-Venezuela

France-St. Lucia (2-10) [1981]

France-Venezuela (2-11) [1980]

United Kingdom-Venezuela

France-United Kingdom
(2-21) [1996]

France-Venezuela (2-11) [1980]

Dominican Republic-United
States

Dominican Republic-Venezuela
(2-9) [1979]

United States-Venezuela
(2-14) [1978]

Dominican Republic-Netherlands

Netherlands-Venezuela
(2-12) [1978]
Dominican Republic-Venezuela
(2-9) [1979]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“[T]he delimitation from point 1 [17° 57' 35" N, 63° 36' 57" W] to
the tripoint [with the Netherlands] shall be completed at the
appropriate time.” (p. 2224-25)

“The maritime delineation line . . . is constituted by the meridian
[62° 48' 50 " W].” (p. 613)
Pt. L1: 14° 04' 50" N, 62° 48' 50" W (p. 599)

“The maritime delineation line . . . is constituted by the meridian
[62° 48' 50 " W].” (p. 613)
Pt. 1: 15° 50' 31" N, 62° 48' 50" W (p. 2232)

“[A]long an azimuth of 274.23 degrees true from point 22 [15° 12'
51" N, 68° 28' 56" W], in the event that the maritime boundary . . .
extends westward, until the tri-junction with a third State is
reached.” (p. 702)
“[T]o a point at [15° 12' 51" N, 68° 28' 56" W].” (p. 589)

Pt. 1: 15° 24' 48" N, 69° 34' 38" W (p. 588)

Pt. 1: 15° 24' 48" N, 69° 34' 38" W (p. 632)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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United Kingdom
(Anguilla)-United
Kingdom (Virgin
Islands)-United States
(Virgin Islands)

United Kingdom (Anguilla)United States (2-17) [1993]
United Kingdom (Virgin Islands)United States (2-16) [1993]
United Kingdom-United Kingdom

Netherlands-St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Kitts and Nevis-Venezuela

Netherlands-Venezuela
(2-12) [1978]

Netherlands (St.
Eus tas ius )-St. Kitts
and Nevis-Venezuela
(Aves)

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

Pt. 50: 17° 57' 51" N, 63° 53' 53" W (p. 2170)

Pt. 1: 17° 57' 51" N, 63° 53' 53" W (p. 2177)

“From point No. 15 [16° 40' 50" N, 63° 37' 50" W], an arc of
maximum circumference to point No. 16 [16° 40' 01" N, 63° 35'
20 " W], or that point on said maximum circumference that
represents the boundary with third nations.” (p. 633)

Pt. 14: 16° 44' 49" N, 64° 01' 08" W (p. 633)

Pt. 1: 16° 44' 49" N, 64° 01' 08" W (p. 701)

United States-Venezuela
(2-14) [1978]
Netherlands-Venezuela
(2-12) [1978]
Netherlands-United States

Netherlands (Saba)United States (Virgin
Islands)-Venezuela
(Ave s)

“[T]he delimitation from point C [17° 35' 03" N, 80° 49' 59" W]
shall, at the appropriate time, be continued in an easterly direction
until it meets the tripoint.” (in this volume)

“[F]rom point 1 [11° 10' 30" N, 61° 43' 46" W] northerly in constant
and true direction following the meridian [61° 43' 46" W] up to the
point at which it meets the jurisdiction of a third State.” (p. 685-86)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Pt. 2: 17° 56' 37" N, 63° 53' 20" W (p. 2177)

Honduras-Jamaica
Jamaica-United Kingdom

Honduras-United Kingdom
(2-23) [2001]

Grenada-Trinidad and Tobago
Grenada-Venezuela

Trinidad and Tobago-Venezuela
(2-13(3)) [1990]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

United Kingdom-United States
(2-17) [1993]
Netherlands-United Kingdom
Netherlands-United States

Endpoint
Tech.

Netherlands (Saba)United Kingdom
(Anguilla)-United
States (Virgin Islands)

Honduras-JamaicaUnited Kingdom
(Cayman Islands)

Grenada-Trinidad and
Tobago-Venezuela

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Cape Verde-Senegal
(4-8 (Vol. III)) [1993]
Cape Verde-Mauritania
(4-12) [2003]
Mauritania-Senegal
Senegal-The Gambia
(4-2) [1975]
Cape Verde-Senegal
(4-8 (Vol. III)) [1993]

Mozambique-Tanzania
(4-7) [1988]
Comoros-Mozambique
Comoros-Tanzania

Cape Verde-SenegalThe Gambia

ComorosMozambique-Tanzania

Cameroon-Nigeria
(4-1(Add. 2)) [2002]
Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria
(4-9) [2000]

Costa Rica-Panama (2-6) [1980]
Colombia-Costa Rica
(3-6) [1984]

Colombia-Panama
(2-5) [1976]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Cape VerdeMauritania-Senegal

Cameroon-Equatorial
Guinea-Nigeria

Region IV. Africa

Colombia-Costa RicaPanama (Pacific
Ocean)

Endpoint
Tech.

“[A] line running due east along the parallel of point ‘D’ [10° 05'
29" S, 41° 02' 01" E].” (p. 899-901)

“The maritime boundary . . . follows the parallel [13° 35' 36" N].”
(p. 854)
Pt. A: 13° 39' 00" N, 20° 04' 25" E (p. 2289)

“[T]he southernmost point, designated as point H [16° 04.0' N, 19°
33.5' E], which cons titutes a tripartite frontier point.” (in this volume)

Pt. H: 16° 04' 05" N, 19° 33' 30" E (p. 2289)

“Northwards and eastwards from Point (i) [04° 01' 37.0" N, 08° 16'
33.0" E] the maritime boundary shall be established . . . following
completion of the . . . case before the [ICJ].” (p. 2667)
“[F]rom point X [04° 17' 00" N, 08° 21' 20" E], the boundary . . .
follows a loxodrome having an azimuth of 187° 52' 27".” (in this volume)

“Starting at [5° 00' 00" N, 79° 52' 00" W] the delimitation . . .
consists of parallel 5° 00' 00" as far as the location where the
delimitation must be made with a third nation.” (p. 534)
northern endpoint: 05° 00' 00" N, 84° 19' 00" W (p. 548)
“[05° 00' 00" N, 84° 19' 00" W] the farthest point of the Costa
Rica-Panama maritime boundary.” (p. 2642)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Region III. South America

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Australia-France (New
Caledonia)-Solomon
Islands
Australia-France (5-1) [1982]
Australia-Solomon Islands
(5-4) [1988]
France-Solomon Islands
(5-17) [1990]

Equatorial Guinea-Sao Tome
and Principe
(4-8 (Vol. IV)) [1999]
Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria
(4-9) [2000]
Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe
(4-10) [2001]

Equatorial GuineaNigeria-Sao Tome and
Principe

Z

Equatorial Guinea-Sao Tome
and Principe
(4-8 (Vol. IV)) [1999]
Gabon-Sao Tome and Principe
(4-11) [2001]
Equatorial Guinea-Gabon

Equatorial Guinea (Rio
Muni)-Gabon-Sao
Tome and Principe

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
Equatorial Guinea-Sao Tome
and Principe
(4-8 (Vol. IV)) [1999]
Gabon-Sao Tome and Principe
(4-11) [2001]
Equatorial Guinea-Gabon

Endpoint
Tech.

Equatorial Guinea
(Annobon)-Gabon-Sao
Tome and Principe

Region V. Central Pacific/East Asia

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Pt. 23: 15° 44' 07" S, 158° 45' 39" E (p. 1172)

Pt. R1: 15° 44' 07" S, 158° 45' 39" E (p. 911)
Pt. R1: 15° 44' 07" S, 158° 45' 39" E (p. 983)

Joint Development Zone (in this volume)

Pt. (x): 02° 52' 10.9" N, 07° 22' 37.8" E (p. 2667)

Pt. 15: 03° 02' 31.75" N, 07° 07' 17.45" E (p. 2655)

Pt. 1: 00° 44' 03" N, 08° 14' 00" E (in this volume)

Pt. 1: 00° 37' 25" N, 08° 11' 42" E (p. 2655)

Pt. 7: 01° 28' 47" S, 07° 16' 16" E (in this volume)

Pt. 1: 01° 29' 04" S, 07° 16' 30" E (p. 2655)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Rank

northern endpoint: 10° 01' 26" S, 168° 31' 25" W (p. 992)

Cook Islands-United States
(5-5) [1980]
New Zealand-United States
(5-14) [1980]
Cook Islands-New Zealand
Cook Islands-United States
(5-5) [1980]
Niue-United States (5-22) [1997]
Cook Islands-Niue

Cook Islands-New
Zealand (Tokelau)United States
(American Samoa)

Cook Islands-NiueUnited States
(American Samoa)

Pt. 1: 17° 33' 18" S, 166° 38' 31" W (p. 2681)

southern endpoint: 17° 33' 28" S, 166° 38' 35" W (p. 991)

eastern endpoint: 10° 01' 26" S, 168° 31' 25" W (p. 1132)

Pt. 21: 17° 47' 00" N, 107° 58' 00" E (in this volume)

Joint Development Zone (p. 1068)

China-Vietnam (5-25) [2000]
China-Brunei, Malaysia or
Philippines
Vietnam -Brunei, Malaysia or
Philippines

China-Japan
China-South Korea

Japan-South Korea (5-12) [1974]

“Point K [08° 46' 54.7754" N, 102° 12' 11.5342" E] is a point
situated on the maritime boundary between [Vietnam and
Cambodia].” (p. 2692)
Overlapping Claims Area (in this volume)

Historical Waters (p. 2364-65)

Pt. 21: 14° 04' 04" S, 157° 02' 18" E (p. 1165)

Pt. U: 14° 04' 00" S, 157° 00' 00" E (p. 983)

Pt. (u): 14° 04' 00" S, 157° 00' 00" E (p. 972)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

China-Vietnam-Brunei,
Malaysia or Philippines

Z

Cambodia-Thailand
(5-24) [2001]

Z

China-Japan-South
Korea

Cambodia-Vietnam
(5-21) [1982]
Thailand-Vietnam
(5-23) [1997]

Z

Cambodia-ThailandVietnam

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
Australia-Papua New Guinea
(5-3) [1978]
Australia-Solomon Islands
(5-4) [1988]
Papua New Guinea-Solomon
Islands (5-16) [1989]

Endpoint
Tech.

3354

Australia-Papua New
Guinea-Solomon
Islands

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Pt. 26a: 14° 50' 03" S, 163° 10' 00" E (p. 1172)

France-Solomon Islands
(5-17) [1990]
France-Vanuatu
Solomon Islands-Vanuatu
France-Tonga
(5-8) [1980]
France-Western Samoa
Tonga-Western Samoa
Indonesia-Malaysia
(5-9(1)) [1969]
Indonesia-Singapore
(5-11) [1973]
Malaysia-Singapore
(5-20) [1995]

France (New
Caledonia)-Solomon
Islands-Vanuatu

France (Wallis and
Futuna)-TongaWestern Samoa

Indonesia-MalaysiaSingapore (East)

Pt. E47: 01° 17' 21.3" N, 104° 07' 34.0" E (p. 2355)

Pt. 6: 01° 16' 10.2" N, 104° 02' 00.0" E (p. 1055)

Pt. 11: 01° 23.9' N, 104° 29.5' E (p. 1025)

“The above-mentioned line shall be composed of all of the points
equidistant from the baselines . . .” (p. 1016-17)

Pt. B5: 13° 14' 25" S, 179 ° 32' 05" E (in this volume)

Fiji-France (5-6(Add. 1, Corr. 1))
[1990]
Fuji-Tuvalu
France-Tuvalu

“The above-mentioned line shall be composed of all of the points
equidistant from the baselines . . .” (p. 1016-17)
Pt. B1: 15° 53' 56" S, 177° 25' 04" W (in this volume)

Pt. A2: 20° 01' 21" S, 172° 45' 53" E (in this volume)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Fiji-France (Wallis and
Futuna)-Tuvalu

Fiji-France (5-6(Add. 1, Corr. 1))
[1990]
Fiji-Tonga

France-Tonga (5-8) [1980]

Fiji-France (Wallis and
Futuna)-Tonga

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
Fiji-France (5-6(Add. 1, Corr. 1))
[1983]
Fiji-Vanuatu
France-Vanuatu

Endpoint
Tech.

Fiji-France (New
Caledonia)-Vanuatu

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Pt. 35: 36° 10.0' N, 131° 15.9' E (p. 1064)

eastern endpoint: 39° 39.3' N, 133° 45.0' E (p. 1153)

Japan-South Korea (5-12) [1974]
Japan-North Korea or
Japan-Russia
South Korea-North Korea or
South Korea-Russia
North Korea-Russia
(5-15(2)) [1986]
North Korea-Japan or
North Korea-South Korea
Russia-Japan or
Russia-South Korea

North Korea-RussiaJapan or South Korea

Defined Area (p. 2341)

Japan-South KoreaNorth Korea or Russia

Indonesia-Vietnam

Pt. 20: 06° 05.8' N, 105° 49.2' E (p. 1026)

Indonesia-Malaysia
(5-9(1)) [1969]
Malaysia-Vietnam (5-19) [1992]

Indonesia-MalaysiaVietnam (West)

Z

Pt. 25: 06° 18.2' N, 109° 38.6' E (p. 1026)

Indonesia-Malaysia
(5-9(1)) [1969]
Indonesia-Vietnam
Malaysia-Vietnam

Indonesia-MalaysiaVietnam (East)

Pt. W25: 01° 15' 51.0" N, 103° 36' 10.3" E (p. 2355)

Pt. 1: 01° 10' 46.0" N, 103° 40' 14.6" E (p. 1055)

Pt. 10: 01° 15.0' N, 103° 22.8' E (p. 1025)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Indonesia-Malaysia
(5-9(1)) [1969]
Indonesia-Singapore
(5-11) [1973]
Malaysia-Singapore
(5-20) [1995]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Indonesia-MalaysiaSingapore (West)

Endpoint
Tech.

3356

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Australia-East TimorIndonesia (East) (EEZ)

Australia-East TimorIndonesia (East) (CS)

Z
Australia-Indonesia
(6-2(6)) [1997]
Australia-East Timor
East Timor-Indonesia

Australia-East Timor
(6-20) [2002]
East Timor-Indonesia

(p. 2718-23)

“In the event of any further delimitation agreement . . . between
governments exercising sovereign rights with respect to the
exploration of the seabed . . . [t he Parties] shall consult each
other . . . on such adjustment . . . as may be necessary in those
portions of the boundary lines between Points A15 [09° 25' S,
128° 00' E] and A16 [09° 28' S, 127° 56' E].” (p. 1216)
Joint Petroleum Development Area (in this volume)

Pt. 19: 16° 50' 25" S, 171° 18' 19" W (p. 2681)

Niue-United States (5-22) [1997]
Niue-Tonga
Tonga-United States

Niue-Tonga-United
States (American
Samoa)

Australia-Indonesia
(6-2(2)) [1972]

western endpoint: 11° 02' 17" S, 173° 44' 48" W (p. 1132)

“Point C [07° 49' 00" N, 103° 02' 30" E] is the northernmost point
of the [Thailand-Malaysia JDA]. The Contracting Parties shall
enter into negotiation with [Malaysia] in order to settle the tripartite
overlapping continental shelf claim[s].” (p. 2692-93)

Defined Area (p. 2341)

Joint Development Area (p. 1107)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

New Zealand-United States
(5-14) [1980]
New Zealand-Western Samoa
United States-Western Sam oa

Malaysia-Thailand
(5-13) [1979]
Malaysia-Vietnam
(5-19) [1992]
Thailand-Vietnam
(5-23) [1997]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

New Zealand
(Tokelau)-United
States (American
Samoa)-Western
Samoa

Z
Z

Malaysia-ThailandVietnam

Region VI. Indian Ocean/South East Asia

Rank

Endpoint
Tech.

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Australia-Indonesia
(6-2(1) [1971]
Australia (Papua New Guinea)Indonesia (6-2(1)) [1971]
Australia-Papua New Guinea
(5-3) [1978]
Seychelles-Tanzania
(6-19) [2002]
Comoros-Seychelles
Comoros-Tanzania
France-Seychelles (6-18) [2001]
Comoros-France
Comoros-Seychelles

Australia-IndonesiaPapua New Guinea

Comoros-SeychellesTanzania

Comoros-France
(Glorieuse)-Seychelles

Australia-East Timor
(6-20) [2002]
East Timor-Indonesia
Australia-Indonesia
(6-2(6)) [1997]
Australia-Indonesia-East Timor
East Timor-Indonesia

Z

Australia-Indonesia
(6-2(2)) [1972]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Australia-East TimorIndonesia (West)
(EEZ)

Australia-East TimorIndonesia (West) (CS)

Endpoint
Tech.

Pt. 1: 11° 08' 23" S, 45° 46' 03" E (in this volume)

Pt. 9: 8° 00' 46.8981" S, 43° 11' 43.6089" E (in this volume)

Pt. (a): 10° 50' 00" S, 139° 12' 00" E (p. 971)

Pt. A3: 10° 50' S, 139° 12' E (p. 1202)

Pt. A3: 10° 50' S, 139° 12' E (p. 1202)

(p. 2718-23)

“In the event of any further delimitation agreement . . . between
governments exercising sovereign rights with respect to the
exploration of the seabed . . . [t he Parties] shall consult each
other . . . on such adjustment . . . as may be necessary in those
portions of the boundary lines . . . between Points A17 [10° 28 S,
126° 00' E] and A18 [10° 37' S, 125° 41' E].” (p. 1216)
Joint Petroleum Development Area (in this volume)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

3358

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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France (Reunion)-Mauritius
(6-5) [1980]
France-France
France (Tromelin)-Mauritius

France (Reunion)France (Tromelin)Mauritius

Pt. P1: 18° 17' 11" S, 55° 30' 20" E (p. 1361)

Pt. 3: 11° 01' 15" S, 48° 29' 07" E (in this volume)

Pt. 1: 15° 43' 10" N, 41° 34' 06" E (p. 2751)
“[Point 1 is] well short of where the boundary line might be
disputed by any third State.” 2
“From [16° 17' 24" N, 41° 47' 00" E] . . . in a straight line parallel
to the latitudes in the direction of the west until the terminus of the
maritime boundaries between the two countries.” (p. 2807)

Pt. 29: 12° 54' 23" N, 43° 13' 58" E (p. 2752)
“[Point 29 is] well short of where the boundary line might be
disputed by any third State.”1

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime Delimination) (Eri./Yemen), 40 I.L.M. 983, 1010 (2001), (Dec. 17, 1999).
Id.

France-Seychelles (6-18) [2001]
France-Madagascar
Madagascar-Seychelles

Eritrea-Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia-Yemen
(6-16) [2000]

Eritrea-Yemen
(6-14) [1999]

Djibouti-Eritrea
Djibouti-Yemen

Eritrea-Yemen
(6-14) [1999]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

France (Glorieuse)MadagascarSeychelles

Eritrea-Saudi ArabiaYemen

Djibouti-Eritrea-Yemen

Endpoint
Tech.

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

1
2

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

India-Maldives-Sri
Lanka

India-IndonesiaThailand

Endpoint
Tech.

Maldives-Sri Lanka

India-Maldives
(6-8) [1976]

India-Sri Lanka
(6-10(2)) [1976]
India-Maldives-Sri Lanka
(6-9) [1976]
India-Sri Lanka
(6-10(2)) [1976]

India-Indonesia-Thailand
(6-7) [1978]

Indonesia-Thailand (6-13) [1975]
India-Indonesia (6-6(2)) [1977]
India-Thailand (6-11) [1978]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“The maritime boundary . . . beyond positions 13m . . . up to the
trijunction point (Point T [04° 47' .04 N, 77° 01'.40 E]) defined in
the trilateral agreement.” (p. 1430-31)
“Recalling the Agreement between India, Maldives and Sri Lanka
concerning the determination of the trijunction point (Point T [04°
47' 04" N, 77° 01' 40" E]).” (p. 1397)

“The extension of the boundary beyond position 13m [05° 00.0' N,
77° 10.6' E] will be done subsequently.” (p. 1426-27)
Point T: 04° 47.04" N, 77° 01.40" E (p. 1407)

Pt. L: 07° 46.1' N, 95° 33.1' E (p. 1471)
Pt. O: 07° 46' 06" N, 95° 31' 12" E (p. 1376)
“The extension of the boundary [from point 1: 07° 48' 00" N, 95°
32' 48" E] up to the trijunction point[] . . . will be done
subsequently.” (p. 1440)
Trijunction point: 07° 47' 00" N, 95° 31' 48" E (p. 1386)
“The boundary of the continental shelves of India and Indonesia
shall be formed by a straight line drawn from the trijunction point . . .
to point number O . . . of India and Thailand . . . by a straight
line drawn from the trijunction point . . . to point number 1 . . . of
Indonesia and Thailand . . . by a straight line drawn from the
trijunction point . . . to point number L.” (p. 1386-87)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

3360

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Indonesia-MalaysiaThailand

India-Myanmar
(Burma)-Thailand

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Endpoint
Tech.

“The boundary line between point 1 [06° 21.8' N, 97° 54.0' E] and
the [Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand] Common Point . . . shall be
formally included in a tripartite agreement to be concluded shortly
among the three Governments.” (p. 1462)
Common Point: 05° 57.0' N, 98° 01.5' E (p. 1452)
“The boundary of the continental shelves of Indonesia and
Thailand shall be formed by the straight line[] drawn from the
Common Point . . . to [point 1] . . . of Indonesia and Malaysia . . .
by the straight line drawn from the Common Point . . . to Point 1. . .
of Malaysia and Thailand . . . by the straight line[] drawn from
the Common Point . . . to [the western point of MalaysiaThailand].” (p. 1452-53)
western endpoint: 06° 18.0' N, 99° 06.7' E (p. 1097)

Pt. 1: 05° 27.0' N, 98° 17.5' E (p. 1025)

“From point 7 [09° 17' 18" N, 95° 36' 31" E] to the tri-junction point
(Point T) [09° 38' 00" N, 95° 35' 25" E].” (p. 2377-80)

“The extension of the boundary [from point 7: 09° 17' 18" N, 95°
36' 31" E] up to the trijunction point[] between . . . India, Thailand
and Burma . . . will be done subsequently.” (p. 1440)
“The extension of the boundary [from point 9: 09° 38' 00" N, 95°
35' 25" E] up to the maritime boundary trijunction point . . . will be
the subject of a subsequent agreement.” (p. 1351)
“The extension of the boundary beyond point 1 [09° 38' 00" N, 95°
35' 25" E] . . . will be done subsequently after the trijunction point
is established by agreement between the three countries.”
(p. 1338-39)
Point T: 09° 38' 00" N, 95° 35' 25" E (p. 2372)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation

Malaysia-Thailand
(5-13(1)) [1979]

Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand
(6-12) [1971]

Indonesia-Malaysia
(5-9(1)) [1969]
Indonesia-Thailand
(6-13(1)) [1971]

India-Myanmar (Burma)Thailand
(6-11(Add. 1)) [1993]
India-Thailand
(6-11(Add. 2)) [1993]

India-Myanmar (Burma)
(6-3) [1986]

Myanmar (Burma)-Thailand
(6-4) [1980]

India-Thailand (6-11) [1978]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
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Bahrain-Iran-Saudi
Arabia

Bahrain-Iran-Qatar

Region VII. Persian Gulf

Iran-Oman-Pakistan

Endpoint
Tech.

Bahrain-Saudi Arabia
(7-3) [1958]
Iran-Saudi Arabia (7-7) [1968]
Bahrain-Iran (7-2) [1971]

Bahrain-Qatar
(7-13) [2001]

Bahrain-Iran
(7-2) [1971]

Iran Qatar
(7-6) [1969]

Oman-Pakistan
(6-17) [2000]
Iran-Om an
Iran-Pakis tan

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“Then the line will extend from point 14 [26° 59' 30" N, 50° 46' 24"
E] in a north-easterly direction.” (p. 1496)
Pt. 1: 27° 10.0' N, 50° 54.0' E (p. 1527)
Pt. 4: 27° 10' 00" N, 50° 54' 00" E (p. 1487)

“Point (1) is the westernmost poi nt on the westernmost part of the
northern boundary line of the continental shelf appertaining to
Qatar formed by a line geodetic azimuth 278° 14' 27" west from
Point 2 [27° 00' 35" N, 51° 23' 00" E].” (p. 1516)
“Point (1) is the Eastern-most point on the Eastern-most part of
the Northern boundary line of the continental shelf appertaining
to Bahrain as formed by the intersection of a line starting from
[27° 00' 35" N, 51° 23' 00" E], and having a geodetic azimuth of
[278° 14' 27" ] with a boundary line dividing the continental shelf
appertaining to Bahrain and Qatar.” (p. 1487)
“Beyond point 42 [27° 02' 00" N, 51° 07' 11" E], the single
maritime boundary shall follow . . . a loxodrome having an
azimuth of 12° 15' 12" , until it meets the delimitation line between . . .
Iran on the one hand and of Bahrain and Qatar on the other.”
(p. 2860)

Pt. 1: 23° 20' 48" N, 61° 25' 00" E (p. 2819)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

3362

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Iran-Oman
(7-5) [1974]

Iran-Oman-United
Arab Emirates (West)

Iran-United Arab Emirates
(7-8) [1974]
Oman-United Arab Emirates

Iran-Saudi Arabia (7-7) [1968]
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia
(7-12) [2000]
Iran-Kuwait

Iran-Kuwait-Saudi
Arabia

Qatar-Saudi Arabia

Bahrain-Qatar
(7-13) [2001]

Bahrain-Saudi Arabia
(7-3) [1958]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Iraq-Kuwait (7-11) [1993]
Iran-Oman
Iran-Pakistan

Endpoint
Tech.

Iran-Iraq-Kuwait

Bahrain-Qatar-Saudi
Arabia

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

“Point (1) is the most western point which is the intersection of the
geodetic line drawn between point (0) [26° 14' 45" N, 55° 42' 15" E]
and point (2) [26° 16' 35" N, 55° 47' 45" E] with the lateral
offshore boundary line between Oman and [the United Arab
Emirates].” (p. 1508)
Pt. 5: 25° 47' 30" N, 54° 45' 07" E (p. 1538)

Pt. 14: 28° 41.3' N, 49° 34.3' E (p. 1527)
“From Point 4 [28° 56' 06" N, 49° 26' 42" E], the line . . .
continues in an easterly direction.” (p. 2837-38)

Pt. 162: 29° 51' 09.6324" N, 48° 24' 50.8383" E (p. 2426)

“The boundary line . . . will begin . . . from point 1, . . . situated at
the mid-point of the line running between the tip of the Ras al Bar
(A) at the southern extremity of Bahrain and Ras Muharra (B) on
the coast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” (p. 1495)
“Below point 1 [25° 34' 34" N, 50° 34' 03" E], the single maritime
boundary shall follow . . . a loxodrome having an azimuth of 234°
16' 53" , until it meets the delimitation line between . . . Saudi
Arabia on the one hand and of Bahrain and Qatar on the other.”
(p. 2859-60)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Iran-Qatar-United Arab
Emirates

Iran-Oman-United
Arab Emirates (East)

Endpoint
Tech.

Albania-Italy-Serbia
and Montenegro

Albania-Greece-Italy

Albania-Serbia and Montenegro

Albania-Italy
(8-11) [1992]

Italy-Serbia and Montenegro
(8-7 (1)) [1969]

Albania-Greece

Greece-Italy
(8-4) [1977]
Albania-Italy
(8-11) [1992]

Qatar-United Arab Emirates
(7-9) [1969]
Iran-Qatar (7-6) [1969]
Iran-United Arab Emirates
(7-8) [1974]

Iran-United Arab Emirates
Om an-United Arab Emirates

Iran-Oman
(7-5) [1974]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“[F]or the moment the demarca tion will not be made beyond point
43 [41° 30.0' N, 18° 13.0' E or 41° 30.0' N, 18° 12.9' E].” (p. 1634,
1637)
“The completion of the determination in the north beyond Point 1
[41° 16' 39" N, 18° 27' 43" E] . . . remains to be accomplished by
later agreements respectively with the respective interested
parties.” (p. 2453-54)

“[F]or the moment such delimitation shall not extend northward
beyond point 1 [39° 47.7' N, 18° 57.5' E].” (p. 1598-99)
“The completion of the determination . . . in the south beyond
point 17 [40° 07' 55" N, 18° 58' 38" E] remains to be
accomplished by later agreements respectively with the
respective interested parties.” (p. 2454)

Pt. 6: 25° 31' 50" N, 53° 02' 05" E (p. 1516)
Pt. 1: 25° 38' 13" N, 54° 05' 16" E (p. 1538)

Pt. A: 25° 31' 50" N, 53° 02' 05" E (p. 1547)

“Point (22) is the most southern point located at the intersection of
the geodetic demarcation line drawn from point (21) [25° 45' 20"
N, 56° 51' 30" E] . . . at an azimuth angle of 190° 00' 00" and the
lateral offshore boundary line between Oman and [the United
Arab Emirates].” (p. 1509)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Region VIII. Mediterranean/Black Sea

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Bulgaria-Turkey
(8-13) [1997]

Bulgaria-RomaniaTurkey

Croatia-Italy
(8-7(2) [1975]
Italy-Slovenia
(8-7(2)) [1975]
Croatia-Slovenia
Croatia-Italy
(8-7(1)) [1968]
Italy-Serbia and Montenegro
(8-7(1)) [1968]
Croatia-Serbia and Montenegro

Croatia-Italy-Slovenia

Croatia-Italy-Serbia
and Montenegro

Bulgaria-Romania
Romania-Turkey

Italy-Tunisia
(8-6) [1971]
Algeria-Tunisia
(8-16) [2002]
Algeria-Italy

Algeria-Italy-Tunisia

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
Italy-Spain
(8-5) [1974]
Algeria-Italy
Algeria-Spain

Endpoint
Tech.

Algeria-Italy-Spain

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

(p. 1634-37)

(p. 1634-37)

(p. 1647)

(p. 1647)

“As for the drawing of the delimitation line . . . further to the northeast direction between [43° 19' 54" N, 31° 06' 33" E] and [43° 26'
49" N, 31° 20' 43" E], . . . such a drawing will be finalized later at
subsequent negotiations which will be held at a suitable time.”
(p. 2882)

Pt. P4: 38° 00' N, 07° 50' E (in this volume)

Pt. 0: 38° 00.6' N, 07° 49.0' E (p. 1623)

“[F]or the moment, the delimitation will not extend . . . south
further than point L [38° 55.0' N, 06° 05.8' E].” (p. 1607)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

ROBERT_f6-3305-3375 2/16/05 1:16 AM Page 3365

Tripoint Issues in Maritime Boundary Delimitation
3365

Rank

France-Italy-Spain

Egypt-Israel-Jordan

Cyprus-Egypt-Israel

Endpoint
Tech.

France-Italy (8-2) [1986]
France-Spain

Italy-Spain (8-5) [1974]

Egypt-Israel
Egypt-Jordan

Israel-Jordan (8-12) [1996]

Cyprus-Israel
Egypt-Israel

Cyprus-Egypt (8-15) [2003]

Cyprus-Greece or
Cyprus-Turkey
Egypt-Greece or Egypt-Turkey

Cyprus-Egypt
(8-15) [2003]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“[F]or the moment, the delimitation will not extend north further
than point A [41° 09.3' N, 05° 56.6' E].” (p. 1607)
Pt. 1: 41° 15' 31.2" N, 08° 48' 49.2" E (p. 1578)

“Thence the maritime boundary follows the medial line of the Gulf
southwards until the last point of the maritime boundary between
the two countries.” (p. 2460)

Pt. 8: 32° 53' 20" N, 32° 58' 20" E
“If any of the two parties is engaged in negotiations aimed at
delimitation of its Exclusive Ec onomic Zone with another state,
this party . . . shall notify and consult the other party, if such
delimitation is in connection with [points] 1 or 8. . . . The
geographical coordinates of points 1 and 8 could be reviewed
and/or extended as necessary.” (in this volume)

Pt. 1: 33° 45' 00" N, 30° 05' 00" E
“If any of the two parties is engaged in negotiations aimed at
delimitation of its Exclusive Ec onomic Zone with another state,
this party . . . shall notify and consult the other party, if such
delimitation is in connection with [points] 1 or 8 . . . The
geographical coordinates of points 1 and 8 could be reviewed
and/or extended as necessary.” (in this volume)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Cyprus-Egypt-Greece
or Turkey

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Libya-Malta- Tunisia or
Italy (West)

Italy-Tunisia- Libya or
Malta

Italy-Libya-Malta (East)

Greece-Italy-Libya

Georgia-RussiaTurkey

Endpoint
Tech.

Malta-Italy or Malta-Tunisia

Libya-Tunisia (8-9) [1982/1988]
or
Libya-Italy

Libya-Malta
(8-8) [1985/1986]

Italy-Libya or Italy-Malta

Italy-Tunisia (8-6) [1971]
Tunisia-Libya (8-9) [1982/1988]
or
Tunisia-Malta

Italy-Libya
Italy-Malta

Libya-Malta
(8-8) [1985/1986]

Greece-Libya
Italy-Libya

Greece-Italy (8-4) [1977]

Georgia-Russia

Pt. 1: 34° 40' 46" N, 13° 50' 00" E (p. 1661)
“[N]o inference can be drawn from the fact that the Court has
taken into account the existence of Italian claims.” 4
“At the point determined by the parallel latitude mentioned above
(34° 10' 30" ) the line of delimitation is to veer towards the
northeast, with a bearing of 52° and extends northeastwards till it
meets a line of delimitation with third States.” (p. 1679)

Pt.. 32: 35° 15.0' N, 13° 36.6' E (p. 1625)
“At the point determined by the parallel latitude mentioned above
(34° 10' 30" ) the line of delimitation is to veer towards the
northeast, with a bearing of 52° and extends northeastwards till it
meets a line of delimitation with third States.” (p. 1679)

Pt. 11: 34° 29' 53" N, 15° 10' 00" E (p. 1661)
“[N]o inference can be drawn from the fact that the Court has
taken into account the existence of Italian claims.” 3

“[F]or the moment such delimitation shall not extend . . .
southward beyond point 16 [35° 34.2' N, 18° 20.7' E].”
(p. 1598-99)

(p. 1699)
(p. 1699)

Russia-Turkey (8-10(2)) [1978]

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Georgia-Turkey (8-10(2)) [1978]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
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3 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 28 (June 3).
4 Id.

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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5 Id.

Belgium-France-United
Kingdom

Belgium-France
(9-16) [1990]
Belgium-United Kingdom
(9-17) [1991]
France-United Kingdom
(9-3(4)) [1991]

(p. 1699)

Russia-Turkey
(8-10(2)) [1978]
Turkey-Ukraine
(8-10(2)) [1978]
(8-10(4)) [1994]
Russia-Ukraine

Russia-Turkey-Ukraine

“The tripoint between the boundaries of . . . the Parties and
[Belgium] shall be defined . . . as follows: Point 15 [51° 33' 28" N,
02° 14' 18" E].” (p. 2466)

Pt. 1: 51° 33' 28" N, 02° 14' 18" E (p. 1909)

Pt. 3: 51° 33' 28" N, 02° 14' 18" E (p. 1899)

“[T]he relevant determinations of future [Ukraine-Russia]
agreements will automatically designate the extreme eastern
point.” (p. 1699, 2443-45)

western endpoint: 43° 26' 59" N, 31° 20' 48" E. (p. 1699,
2443-45)

Pt. 1: 34° 40' 46" N, 13° 50' 00" E (p. 1661)
“[N]o inference can be drawn from the fact that the Court has
taken into account the existence of Italian claims.” 5

“At the point determined by the parallel latitude mentioned above
(34° 10' 30" ) the line of delimitation is to veer towards the
northeast, with a bearing of 52° and extends northeastwards till it
meets a line of delimitation with third States.” (p. 1679)
Pt.. 32: 35° 15.0' N, 13° 36.6' E (p. 1625)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Turkey-Ukraine
(8-10(2)) [1978]
(8-10(4)) [1994]
R om ania-Turke y
R om ania-Ukraine (8-17)

Tunisia-Italy (8-6) [1971]
or
Tunisia-Malta
Libya-Malta (8-8) [1985/1986]
or
Libya-Italy

Libya-Tunisia (8-9) [1982/1988]

Associated Biletral
Rel ationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Romania-TurkeyUkraine

Libya-TunisiaItaly or Malta

Endpoint
Tech.
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Region IX. Northern and Western Europe

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Denmark (Greenland)Iceland-Norway (Jan
Mayen)

Denmark-GermanyUnited Kingdom

Belgium-NetherlandsUnited Kingdom

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Endpoint
Tech.

Iceland-Norway
(9-4(2)) [1997]

Denmark-Norway
(9-19(2)) [1997]

Denmark-Iceland
(9-22) [1997]

Germany-United Kingdom
(9-12) [1971]

Denmark-United Kingdom
(9-10) [1971]

Denmark-Germany
(9-8) [1969/1971]

Belgium-United Kingdom
(9-17) [1991]
Belgium-Netherlands
(9-21) [1996]

Netherlands-United Kingdom
(9-13) [1965]

Associated Bilateral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“The boundary point A [69° 35.0' N, 13° 16.0' W] has been
established in cooperation with [Norway] and shall be confirmed
through bilateral agreements with [Norway].” (p.2951-52)
“Having further regard to c onsultations between [Norway,
Denmark and Iceland] . . . which led to agreement on the
determination of point [5: 69° 35' 00" N, 13° 16' 00" W] . . . where
the delimitation lines of the th ree States intersect.” (p. 2919)
“Having further regard to consultations between [Norway, Iceland
and Denmark] . . . which led to agreement on the determination of
point 1 [69° 35' 00" N, 13° 16' 00" W] . . . where the delimitation
lines of the three stat es intersect.” (p. 2910)

“The termination point S7 [55° 55' 09.4" N, 03° 21' 00.0" E] of the
boundary line shall be the point of intersection of the boundary
lines between the German, Danish and British portions of the
continental shelf.” (p. 1810)
“In the south the termination point [55° 55' 09.4" N, 03° 21' 00.0"
E] of the dividing line is the point of intersection of the dividing
lines between [Denmark, the United Kingdom and Germany].”
(1833-34)
“In the north the termination point of the dividing line shall be point
No. 3 [55° 55' 09.4" N, 03° 21' 00.0" E], which is the point of
intersection of the dividing lines between [the United Kingdom,
Germany and Denmark].” (p. 1856-57)

Pt. 6: 51° 52' 34.012" N, 02° 32' 21.599" E (p. 2936)

“In the south the termination point of the dividing line shall be
point No. 1 [51° 48' 18" N, 02° 28' 54" E], which is the point of
intersection of the dividing lines between [the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Belgium].” (p. 1866-67)
Pt. 3: 51° 48' 18" N, 02° 28' 54" E (p. 1909)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Rank

France-Ireland-United
Kingdom

Denmark (Faroe
Islands)-NorwayUnited Kingdom

Denmark-NorwayUnited Kingdom

Endpoint
Tech.

France-United Kingdom
(9-3) [1977]
Ireland-United Kingdom
(9-5) [1988]
France-Ireland

Denmark-United Kingdom
(9-23) [1999]

Denmark-Norway (9-1) [1979]

Norway-United Kingdom
(9-15) [1978]

Denmark-United Kingdom
(9-10) [1971]

Denmark-Norway
(9-9) [1965]

Norway-United Kingdom
(9-15) [1965]

Norway-Sweden (9-14) [1968]
Denmark-Sweden (10-2) [1984]

Denmark-Norway (9-9) [1968]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

Pt. 94: 46° 34.00' N, 12° 12.00' W (p. 1777)

Pt. N: 48° 06' 00" N, 09° 36' 30" W (p. 1749)

“In the north, the termination point of the dividing line . . . shall be
point No. 26 [63° 53' 14.93" N, 00° 29' 19.55" W], the point which
is equidistant from . . . the baselines . . . of [the United Kingdom,
Norway and Denmark]. The position of point No. 26 shall be
subject to acceptance by [Denmark].” (p. 1888)
“[T]he south end-point [63° 53' 14.93" N, 00° 29' 19.55" W] is
equidistant from . . the baselines . . of [Denmark, Norway and the
United Kingdom].” (p. 1717-18)
“In the north-east, the termination point [63° 53' 14.93" N, 00° 29'
19.55" W] is the equidistant tripoint between [Denmark, Norway
and the United Kingdom].” (p. 2970, 2976)

“In the south the termination point of the dividing line shall be
point No. 1 [56° 05' 12" N, 03° 15' 00" E], which is the point of
intersection of the dividing lines between [the United Kingdom,
Norway and Denmark]. The position of . . . point No. 1 shall be
subject to acceptance by the Kingdom of Denmark.” (p. 1885-86)
“The Contracting Parties intend, if need be, to make a final
determination of [point 8: 56° 05' 12" N, 03° 15' 00.0" E] after
consultation with the third countries concerned.” (p. 1820-21,
1823)
“In the north the termination point [56° 05' 12.0" N, 03° 15' 00.0"
E] of the dividing line is the point of intersection of the dividing
lines between [Denmark, the United Kingdom and Norway].”
(p. 1833-34)

“[58° 15' 41.2" N, 10° 01' 48.1" E is the] point of intersection of the
lines delimiting those parts of the continental shelf which
appertain to Norway, Denmark and Sweden.” (p. 1822)
Pt. 5: 58° 15' 41.2" N, 10° 01' 48.1" E (p. 1877)
Pt. A: 58° 15' 41.2" N, 10° 01' 48.1" E (p. 1940)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Denmark-NorwaySweden

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Portugal-MoroccoSpain

Germany-NetherlandsUnited Kingdom

Denmark-GermanySweden

Denmark (Bornholm)Germany-Poland

Region X. Baltic Sea

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Endpoint
Tech.

“West of point 1 [55° 00' 36" N, 13° 09' 23" E or 55° 00' 36" N, 13°
09' 26" E] the boundary line shall extend to the outer points which
will have to be agreed with the third State concerned.” (p. 2037)
“From point M [55° 00' 35.2" N, 13° 08' 45.0" E] the demarcation
line continues as a straight line up until a point on which
agreement is met with the third party in question.” (p. 1940)
Pt. 7: 55° 00' 30.2" N, 13° 08' 53.1" E (p. 2094)
“[T]he Contracting Parties int end to establish the nal coordinates after consultation with the State[] concerned.” (p. 2095)

Pt. 12: 54° 32' 10.4" N, 14° 38' 12.2" E
“[T]he Contracting Parties int end to establish the final coordinates after consultation with the State[] concerned.” (p.2095)
“The boundary . . . extends from point M [54° 32' 01.31" N, 14° 37
45.23 E] further in a north-easterly direction to a point to be
agreed upon between [Germany, Poland and Denmark]” (p. 2021)

Pt. P: 35° 50' 00" N, 07° 23' 48" W (p. 1799)

“The boundary termination point E8 [55° 45' 54" N, 03° 22' 13" E]
is the point of intersection of the boundaries of the Netherlands,
German and British parts of the continental shelf.” (p. 1844-45)
“In the south the termination point of the dividing line shall be
point No. 1 [55° 45' 54.0" N, 03° 22' 13.0" E], which is the point of
intersection of the dividing lines between [the United Kingdom,
Germany and the Netherlands].” (p. 1856)
“In the north the termination point of the dividing line shall be point
No. 19 [55° 45' 54" N, 03° 22' 13" E], which is the point of
intersection of the dividing lines between [the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Germany].” (p. 1868)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Denmark-Germany
(10-11) [1988]

Denmark-Sweden
(10-2) [1984]

Germany-Sweden
(10-7) [1978]

Denmark-Poland

Germany-Poland (10-6) [1989]

Denmark-Germany
(10-11) [1988]

Portugal-Spain (9-7) [1976]
Portugal-Morocco
Morocco-Spain

Netherlands-United Kingdom
(9-13) [1971]

Germany-United Kingdom
(9-12) [1971]

Germany-Netherlands
(9-11) [1969/1971]

Associated Bilateal
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
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Estonia-FinlandRussia

Denmark (Bornholm)Poland-Sweden

Denmark (Bornholm)Germany-Sweden

Endpoint
Tech.

Estonia-Russia

Finland-Russia
(10-4 (1)) [1965]
Estonia-Finland
(10-16) [1996]

Denmark-Poland

Poland-Sweden
(10-10) [1989]

Denmark-Sweden
(10-2) [1984]

Denmark-Germany
(10-11) [1988]

Denmark-Sweden
(10-2) [1984]

Germany-Sweden
(10-7) [1978]

Associated Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“The starting point of the boundary is that point in the east on
which agreement will be reached with the third State concerned.
From this point the boundary intersects the following points [59°
59.678' N, 26° 20.147' E].” (p. 3038)

(p. 1967-68)

“From point S [55° 21' 18.6" N, 16° 30' 29.7" E] the demarcation
line continues as a straight line up to a point on which an
agreement is made with the third party in question.” (p. 1940)
“From point A [55° 21.640' N, 16° 32.000' E] to the Wes t . . . the
delimitation line shall continue to [a point] on which Agreement
shall be reached with the third state concerned.” (p. 2085-86)

“East of point 3 [54° 57' 52" N, 13° 59' 12" E or 54° 57' 52" N, 13°
59' 15" E] the boundary line shall extend to the outer points which
will have to be agreed with the third State concerned.” (p. 2037)
“[T]he demarcation line is drawn as a straight line from a point on
which an agreement is reached with the third party, and continues
through the following points [Pt. P: 54° 57' 49.1" N, 13° 59' 40.0"
E].” (p. 1940)
Pt. 8: 54° 57' 44.8" N, 13° 59' 34.2" E (p. 2094)
“[T]he Contracting Parties int end to establish the final coordinates after consultation with the State[] concerned.” (p.2095)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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Rank

Latvia-LithuaniaSweden

Estonia-Latvia-Sweden

Estonia-FinlandSweden

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Endpoint
Tech.

“The boundary . . . shall be a straight line (loxodrome) in the
azimuth of 270 . . . running from point II [56° 02' 43.5" N, 20° 42
35.0" E] . . . towards the boundary . . . of the third State. The
tripoint . . . shall be establis hed by trilateral agreement between
the States concerned.” (p. 3125-26).

“The maritime boundary . . . [continues from point 15: 57° 45.783
N, 21° 50.567' E] as a straight geodetic line in the azimuth of 298°
19.35 up to the boundary . . . [of Sweden]. The precise
coordinates of point 16 . . . shall be determined by a trilateral
agreement.” (3015-16)
“Desiring to determine the point where the maritime boundaries of
the three States in the Baltic Sea coincide, have agreed as
follows: The straight geodetic line referred to in [Estonia-Latvia] . . .
shall connect to the border . . . [of Sweden] at the point [58°
01.440 N, 20° 23.775' E].” (p. 3056)
Pt. A: 58° 01.440' N, 20° 23.755' E (p. 3105)

“South of Point 5 [58° 51.776' N, 20° 28.276' E], the boundary
runs to the point on which an agreement is made with the third
State concerned.” (p. 2553)
“From the last point in the list [58° 50.677' N, 20° 28.902' E] the
boundary runs to the point on which agreement will be reached
with the third [state] concerned.” (p. 3039)
“From point D [58° 46.812' N, 20° 28.448' E] the delimitation line
shall continue to a point which is to be agreed upon with the third
State concerned.” (p. 3105-06)
“From the points indicated below, [Estonia-Finland “last” point,
Finland-Sweden point 5, Estonia-Sweden point D], the lines of
delimitation shall be drawn as straight (geodetic) lines to a
common point [58° 50.670' N, 20° 28.888' E].” (p. 3138-39)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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Latvia-Sweden
Lithunia-Sweden

Latvia-Lithuania
(10-20) [1999]

Estonia-Sweden (10-19) [1998]
Latvia-Sweden

Estonia-Latvia-Sweden
(10-17) [1997]

Estonia-Latvia
(10-15) [1996]

Estonia-Finland-Sweden
(10-21) [2001]

Estonia-Sweden
(10-19) [1998]

Estonia-Finland
(10-16) [1996]

Finland-Sweden
(10-13) [1995]

Associat ed Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
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Poland-RussiaSweden

Lithuania-RussiaSweden

Endpoint
Tech.

“The line of delimitation . . . continues [through point 3: 55°
55.420' N, 19° 02.805' E or 55° 55.435' N, 19° 02.923' E] to the
junction point . . . of a third party by means of straight lines
(loxodromes). [T]he junction point . . . will be defined with the
latter’s participation.” (p. 3074-75)

Lithuania-Russia
(10-18(1)) [1997]

Poland-Russia-Sweden
(10-12) [1989]

Poland-Sweden
(10-10) [1989]

Russia-Sweden
(10-9) [1988]

Poland-Russia
(10-8) [1985]

“[Pt. D: 55° 51' 00" N, 18° 56' 12" E] up to the junction point of the
corresponding marine areas of [Russia, Poland, and Sweden].”
(p. 2056)
“From . . . point A17 [55° 53.482' N, 18° 56.777' E or 55° 53.482'
N, 18° 56.717' E] in the south, the delimitation line shall continue
to [a point] that [is] agreed with a third state concerned.”
(p. 2074-75)
“From . . . point F [55° 52.876' N, 18° 54.000' E] to the East the
delimitation line shall continue to [a point] on which Agreement
shall be reached with the third state concerned.” (p. 2086)
“From the points indicated below: [Poland-Russia point D, RussiaSweden point A 17, Poland-Sweden point F]; the delimitation line
continues along straight lines (geodet ic lines) to the junction point
[55° 52.788' N, 18° 55.545' E].” (p. 2103-04)

(p. 2074-75)

Russia-Sweden (10-9) [1988]

Lithuania-Sweden

Remarks (IMB Page Number)

Associat ed Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]
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Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint
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AzerbaijanKazakhstanTurkmenistan

AzerbaijanKazakhstan-Russia

Region XI. Caspian Sea

Rank

Actual or Potential
Tripoint

Endpoint
Tech.

Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan

Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan
(11-3) [2003]

Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan
(11-3) [2003]
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Russia
(11-4) [2003]

Azerbaijan-Russia
(11-1) [2002]

Kazakhstan-Russia
(11-2) [2002]

Associat ed Bilate ral
Relationships
(IMB Report Number) [Year]

“The end point [41° 32.4' N, 50° 56.6' E] . . . may be taken as the
junction point . . . between [Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan], which should be recorded in a tripartite agreement
among them.” (in this volume)

trijunction point: 42° 33.6' N, 49° 53.3' E (in this volume)

“The above point [42° 33.6' N, 49° 53.3' E] may be taken as the
junction point . . . among [Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan],
which will be recorded in a trilateral agreement among them.”
(in this volume)
“The said point [42° 33.6' N, 49° 53.3' E] may be recognized as
the intersecting point . . . among [Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan], and this will be cove red by a trilateral agreement.”
(in this volume)
“The initial point [42° 33.6' N, 49° 53.3' E] . . . is the junction point
. . . between [Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia].” (in this volume)

Remarks (IMB Page Number)
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